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Introduction 
For three weeks during April 2005 such large cities as Shanghai and Beijing 
became scenes of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations staged by mainly young 
people attracted to them by information sent via such media as the Internet and cell 
phones. 
The Chinese government turned a blind eye to the protests at first, but eventually 
intervened with strong-arm methods to quell a series of disturbances that mark the 
lowest ebb reached in Sino-Japanese relations since the normalization of diplomatic 
relations in 1972. 
In contrast to such political upheaval, 21st century East Asia as a whole has been 
tending more and more towards cooperation and the development of a de facto 
regional integration, on the strength of close, interdependent economic relations that 
have developed among its countries.  This why the political trouble that is occurring 
between the two most powerful members who should be forming the nucleus of 
cooperation in the region is cause for uneasiness in terms of both security and 
prosperity. 
Although the event that directly triggered the demonstrations was Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi's rejection of Chinese government demands that he put a stop 
to his yearly visits to worship Japan's war dead (including internationally convicted 
A-class war criminals) at Shinto ceremonies held at Yasukuni Shrine, the root causes 
are far more serious, since they are attributable to the structural changes taking place 
in Sino-Japanese relations and the change taking place in the balance of power in East 
Asia due to China's economic and military emergence. 
In my opinion, Sino-Japanese relations have gone through four distinct phases 
since normalization in 1972. 
Phase I 
during the 1970s was characterized by a tone of  friendship, albeit in differing 
degrees, which gave birth to rough expectations about the development new relations 
between the two countries. It was a time in which China was deeply concerned about 
strategic military affairs and Japan responded positively to them, creating an era of 
“strategic friendship." 
The period was marked by the fall of the Deng Xiao-ping regime, the death of 
Mao Zedong, the arrest and trial of the “Gang of Four," and continuing turmoil within 
Communist party ranks at the Central Working Conference convened by Deng 
Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and Chen Yun at the end of 1978, extending to the 11th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). It was also a time of the conclusion 
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of a Peace and Friendship Treaty after the addition of an anti-hegemony article 
directed at the Soviet Union was cleared with Japan. 
Phase 2 
spanning the 1980s and early 90s, in which China's efforts at reform and open-up 
policy supported by Japan in the spirit of the latter's “modernization."  While we 
cannot ignore the economic troubles stemming from China's balance of payments 
deficit, the Japanese textbook controversy and litigation between the Nationalists and 
Communists governments over the rights to a Chinese-owned dormitory in Kyoto.But 
Japan and China both recognized the structure of “aid-giving country" and 
“aid-recipient country". 
It was a time when the United States was seeking a “strong, stable China,” and 
has been called the “golden age” or “honeymoon era” in relations between the three 
countries.１  
Phase 3 
from the late 1990s to 2004, was a time of “structural fluctuation,” during which 
the Cold War ended, Taiwan demanded national independence, the US-Japan security 
system was restructured and China grew into an economic super power. During this 
time, the Japanese public began to feel that the “postwar” era of apologizing to China 
over what had happened in the past had come to an end. 
Phase 4 
Now a fourth period has been ushered in by the recent anti- Japanese  
demonstrations of April 2005. The perception gap concerning the modern history is 
widening between the two countries as they enter a relationship of rivalry in both 
areas of economics and military security within East Asia. The petition opposing a bid 
by Japan for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council that was circulating during 
the time of the demonstrations among the world's overseas Chinese community over 
the Internet suggests that the rivalry may turn out to be more nasty than friendly in 
the years to come. 
This article aims at reexamining diplomatic normalization between the two 
countries that took place over thirty years ago, review the decade and a half 
“honeymoon" that began in the 1980s, analyze the structure of relations as we entered 
the “era of rivalry" in 2005, and finally offer six proposals about how to rebuild 
relations between the two countries. 
 
                                                             
１  Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming and Tanaka Akihiko eds., The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan 
Triangle,1972-1989, Harvard Univ. Press, 2003 
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Ⅰ  The Meaning of Normalization 
1. US-China Reconciliation as a Precondition 
【Strategic Intentions of the US and China】    Contact between the United 
States and China, which began in secret during the spring of 1969, took place while 
China was feeling a threat from the USSR after Warsaw Pact military troop 
intervention in the Czechoslovakian “liberalization" movement in August 1968 and a 
skirmish between Soviet and Chinese border guards at the Ussuri River in March of 
1969. It was also a time during which the Nixon Administration was trying to extricate 
itself from the quagmire it had created in Vietnam. 
Then from November 1970, secret US-Chinese talks got underway in earnest 
through the mediation of Pakistan President Yahya Kahn, followed by a secret visit to 
China in July 1971 by then Special Assistant to the President for National Securty 
Affairs Henry Kissinger, and leading to the world-shaking US-Chinese communiqué 
that announced Nixon's official visit to China in early 1972. 
What the newly inaugurated Nixon expected of China was to get it involved in the 
Vietnam appeasement process and use improvement in US-Chinese relations as 
leverage in strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union.  
As Nixon's strategist, Kissinger, who believed that the conventional opinion of 
China in the eyes of US policymakers as a mixed up, reckless, irrelevant country with 
expansionist desires and crazy ideological views was mistaken, felt that the two 
countries should search for common interests and that China should be considered 
not in ideological, but rather geopolitical terms. 
He believed that the Nixon administration was embarking on a new era of 
international relations and that one way of building a new perspective regarding 
American diplomacy was by making friends with a country inhabited by a quarter of 
the world’s population.２。  
According to a recently declassified memorandum of a meeting between Nixon, 
Kissinger and security advisor Alexander Haig held in 1 July,1971,before the opening 
of negotiations with China, they felt that it was necessary to impress on the Chinese 
that a possible threat from Japan was 
on the horizon, to instill fear in the Chinese concerning Japanese remilitarization 
and the Soviet threat, and be as vague as possible on the question of Taiwan.３  
Concerning China's motivation, among the various opinions posed among 
Chinese scholars, the Soviet factor, particularly the 1969 border incident, is most 
often cited. However, there is also the opinion that North Vietnam's ability to 
                                                             
２  Henry Kissinger,White House Years ,Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979．  
３  “Memorandum for the President’s Files, “Meeting Between President, Dr. Kissinger, and General Haig, 
July 1, 1971”, in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.66, William Burr ed, The 
Beijing=Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China, September 1970-July 1971,  
Feb 27, 2002. 
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overcome initial Chinese opposition and open secret talks with the US in the spring of 
1968 had a lot to do with China following suit.４。  
Meanwhile, within the core of the Communist Party, which was controlled by Lin 
Biao and the “Gang of Four," Zhou Enlai was operating carefully but persistently, as 
shown by the 8-point report on US-Chinese relations and the questions of Taiwan and 
Indonesia he submitted to a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of CCP on 26 
May 1971, including 
1. Complete evacuation and removal of all US military forces and facilities 
from Taiwan Province and the Strait of Taiwan vicinity within a fixed 
timetable. 
2. Taiwan is a territory of China and the question of its ｌｉｂｅｒａｔｉｏｎ  is a 
Chinese internal affair closed to foreigners. In particular, Taiwan must 
be protected from Japanese militarism at all costs. 
3. China will cooperate fully in the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and 
conduct its Taiwan operations with the greatest care. 
4. Unconditional opposition to any movement advocating “two Chinas” or 
“one China, one Taiwan.” 
5. Until the above conditions are fully realized, no diplomatic negotiations 
will take place, but liaison offices can be set up in the two capitals. 
6. China will not bring up the question of a PRC seat in the United 
Nations.５。 
【Major points of Kissinger / Zhou Talks】  Kissinger and Zhou met in July and 
October of 1971 to discuss future relations between the two countries, Taiwan, 
Indochina, Japan, Korea, India-Pakistan relations, the Soviet Union and what to tell 
everybody when Nixon‘s visit China. 
Concerning the Taiwan question, Kissinger started out by proposing,  
1. Two-thirds of the US forces stationed on Taiwan will be ｅｖａｃｕａｔｅｄ as 
soon as the war in Indochina is over. The remaining one-third will be 
gradually reduced in proportion to the progress made in US-China relations. 
This the personal decision of the president that has not been divulged to 
either Congress or the executive branch. 
                                                             
４  Niu Jun,“Historical Background to Changes in China’s US Policy at the End of the 1960s,” Dangdai 
Zhongguoshi Yanjiu,No.1,2000. 
５  Shen Zhihua ed. Zhongsi Guanxi Dangan(Archives on the Sino-Soviet Relations),Jan.2000. 
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2. The United States is pushing neither a “two Chinaｓ” nor a “one China, 
one Taiwan” solution. 
3. The US does not support the Taiwanese independence movement. 
4.   What we do want is a quick solution to our military problems during 
the president’s present term of office, if the War ends, and solution to 
political problems during the early part of  his second term. 
Z h o u  r e s p o n d e d  w i t h  h i s  o w n  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  b r e a k t h r o u g h  o f  S i n o - U S  
r e l a t i o n s .  
1.  It must be recongized that the Government of the People‘s Republic of 
China is the sole legitinate government representing the Chinese people.  
2.  It must be recognized that Taiwan belongs to China; that it is an 
inalienable part of China which was returned to China after World War ll.  
３.  US does not support a two Chinas or a one China, one Taiwan policy 
and does not support the socalled Taiwan Independence Movement. 
4 .   T h e  s o p k e s m a n  o f  t h e  D e p r a t m e n t  o f  S t a t e  n o  l o n g e r  r e i t e r a t e s  
w h a t  h e  s a i d ,  t h a t  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  T a i w a n  i s  u n d e t e r m i n e d . " ６ 
While expressing reservations about a “sole legitimate government, " Kissinger 
accepted Zhou's demands and stated that diplomatic talks with China would be 
possible during the early part of Nixon's second term. 
Heated debate continued on such issues as whether Taiwan should be excluded 
from the UN, whether the military alliance treaty between the US and Taiwan should 
be rescinded and where to compromise on the question of “sole legitimate 
government.” 
In the end, driven by the choice to exclude Taiwan from the UN and allow the 
People’s Republic a UN seat, Kissinger drafted a joint communiqué stating in effect 
that the United States would not oppose the idea of one China inclusive of all Chinese 
people residing on either sides of the Strait of Taiwan. 
 
【Nixon's Visit to China and the Shanghai Communique】    In February 
1972, when Richard Nixon became the first American president to make a formal visit 
to China, Mao Zedong was more interested in talking about “philosophy" and left the 
diplomatic particulars up to Zhou Enlai.７  
                                                             
６  “Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, 10July 1971 Afternoon, Document 35, Document 36, in ibid.,  National 
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.66. 
７  “Memcon of Nixon and Mao, 21 February 1972,” in William Burr ed., The Kissinger Transcripts  The 
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The political discussion that ensued between Nixon-Kissinger and Zhou included 
such diversified topics as the Taiwan question, the withdrawal of US troops from 
there, Vietnam, normalization of Sino-US diplomatic relations, releasing information 
about the Soviet Union, the US security alliance with Japan, Korea, and the 
India-Pakistan dispute. The result of these tough negotiations is the US-China 
Shanghai Communique.  
In the Communique, both countries recognized the normalization of diplomatic 
relations as in their mutual interests and denied that they had any plans for hegemony 
in the Asian Pacific region. 
Then the Chinese side went on to state that 1) the People's Republic constituted 
the sole legal government of China, Taiwan is a province of China, 2) all U.S. forces 
and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan,and 3)  Chinese 
Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one 
Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or 
advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." 
On the other hand, US. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all 
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that 
position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by 
the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective 
of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the 
meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan 
as the tension in the area diminishes. ８   
While both countries also agreed on continued contact through liaison offices, 
etc. to discuss diplomatic normalization, it was not achieved until January 1979, due 
to such events as Nixon’s resignation over the Watergate affair, the political attacks 
launched on Zhou and Deng by the “Gang of Four”, and the deaths of Zhou and Mao. 
From these negotiations, it was China who gained the most.  Zhou must have 
breathed a huge sigh of relief when hearing Kissinger's four conditions at the 
beginning of the talks of July 1971, for according to James Man of the Los Angeles 
Times, 
“ In short, the discussions of Taiwan on Kissinger‘s trip were considerably more 
extensive than Kissinger or Nixon ever wanted to admit. The Nixon administration 
made many, though not all, of the concessions China had sought.”９  
 
【US and China Strategis towards Japan】    In these negotiations between 
the US and Chinese leaders, it is interesting how freely they were able to talk about 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Top-Secret Talks with Beijing & Moscow, The New Press, New York, 1999.  
８  Joint Communique Between the People's Republic of China and the United States，27 Feb. 1972 
９  James Man, Abour Face—A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to 
Clinton, Vintage Books, 1998. 
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their respective images of and strategies toward Japan. 
Zhou urged Kissinger of the need to beware of Japan, stating that if the US 
military forces were to withdraw from Asia, Japan in its newly found economic 
prosperity would return to Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula in military regalia, and 
demanding that Kissinger promise such a scenario would not come about, at least in 
Taiwan (9 July). 
Zhou continued,  
Thus there is a great possibility that before the U.S. forces have withdrawn from 
these areas and from Taiwan, armed forces of Japan shall enter.  Entry into Taiwan 
would be possible because Japan and Taiwan still have a treaty, concluded with 
Chiang Kai-shek – the so-called Peace Treaty, and they are now stressing that fact．１ ０   
Zhou cited Japan’s imperial institution as the basis of Japanese militarism, and 
severely criticized US policy and the strengthening of the US-Japan security 
agreement as supporting the gradual revival of militarism there. Even in October, 
during the final stages of drafting the Communique, Zhou was adamant about gradual 
US withdrawal promoting the deployment of Japanese troops to Taiwan. 
In response, Kissinger repeated that the presence of US troops was a deterrent 
(“bottle cap”) to Japanese military escalation and that the US-Japan Security 
Agreement existed for that purpose. 
On 9 July,Kissinger told Zhou who arguing the evacuation of US troops from 
Japan, 
“In fact, Mr. Prime Minister, from the point of view of the sort of theory 
which I used to teach in universities, it would make good sense for us to 
withdraw from Japan, allow Japan to re-arm, and then let Japan and China 
balance each other off in the Pacific.  This is not our policy.  A heavily 
rearmed Japan could easily repeat the policies of the 1930’s ”．１１  
At Feb.1972 talks, President Nixon stated, 
“The Japanese, with their enormously productive economy, their great 
natural drive and their memories of the war they lost, could well turn 
toward building their own defenses in the event that the U.S. guarantee were 
removed.  That’ s why I say that where Taiwan is concerned, and I would 
                                                             
１０  Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, 10 July 1971, in ibid, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 
Book No.66, The Beijing=Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China, 
September 1970- July 1971, Document 35. 
 
１１  “Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, 9 July, 1971,” in Ibid., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 
Book No.66, The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China, 
September 1970- July 1971,Document 34.n  
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add where Korea is concerned, the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in 
as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that.  And if we had no 
defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is 
concerned”…It is our policy to discourage Japan from any military 
intervention in Korea……I cannot guarantee it, but we believe we can very 
strongly influence Japan and our purpose will be to discourage any Japanese 
adventure against Korea or Taiwan. ”１２。 
On the other hand, both parties held surprisingly similar images of Japan. To 
Kissinger’s comment that in contrast to the universal points of view held by the 
Chinese in accordance with tradition, Japanese points of view tend to be narrow in 
scope, Zhou replied, “They’re a group of islanders.” Kissinger went on to complain ; 
The Japanese have no sensibility for the attitudes of other people because of this 
cultural concentration on themselves. I say this because this peculiarity of Japan 
imposes special responsibilityes on all who have to deal with them. You as well as 
us(22 October,1971)１ ３  
National characteristics aside, Zhou was being contradictory in his statements 
about US policy towards Japan: on the one hand, asking the US to pull in the reins on 
Japan military escalation, while at the same time calling for American withdrawal 
from the region. Zhou had no doubt put his hopes in a neutral Japan and a 
peace-loving Japanese people. After the 1971 October talks, a rather ambivalent 
Kissinger reported to Nixon, “we agree that an expansionist Japan would be 
dangerous, but we disagree on how to prevent this. Our triangular relationship could 
prove to be one of our most difficult problems ".１ ４  
The greatest problems for Zhou was on what ideological and strategic basis to 
decide about normalization of relations with Japan coming up next year, given his 
present pessimistic view about that country in general and what to do about it 
politically. I wonder how much stock he put in Kissinger’s “guarantees” to “put a lid 
on” possible Japanese military escalation. 
2. Negotiations Over Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization 
【Tanaka‘s visit to Japan】   With the above rapprochement reached between 
China and the United States, the dam that had held back unofficial political and 
economic ties between China and Japan to a trickle suddenly burst. 
                                                             
１２  “Memorandm of Conversation, 23 February 1972,” in National Security Archive, William Burr ed., 
Nixon’s Trip to China-- Records now completely Declassified, Posted , December 11, 2003, Document 4．   
１３  in Negociating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement, New American and Chinese Documention Leading up to 
Nixon’s 1972 Trip . National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No.70,Document 13, 22 October, 
1971. 
１４  Kissinger to Nixon, “My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues” , in ibid., National Security 
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.70, Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement, Document 20. 
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In particular, during his visit to China in July 1972, Komei Party Chairman 
Takeiri Yoshikatsu was surprised to hear Zhou said that Chairman Mao had 
mentioned relinquishing China's right to demand war reparations from Japan, since 
such demands would overburden the Japanese people, and that Mao was also thinking 
that a joint statement to that effect would be in order.  Takeiri recalls, “Thinking we 
would have to pay somewhere in the range of fifty billion dollars, I began shaking all 
over after such a bombshell."１ ５  It was in this way that one of the most serious 
barriers separating the two countries was eliminated before Prime Minister Tanaka 
Kakuei's official China visit. 
Concerning another large barrier, Taiwan, in the Zhou-Takeiri talks and others, 
Japan refused a Chinese proposal for a gentlemen’s agreement to break political ties 
with Taiwan and left that issue for Tanaka’s visit during September 1972, about two 
months after he had been appointed prime minister.  
It was on the 25th of that month that Tanaka reached an agreement with Mao and 
Zhou concerning the “joint communique," which ended twenty-seven years of 
“abnormal" relations between the two countries. 
 
【Sino-Japanese Joint Communique】 The four most important points in these 
epoch-making negotiations were; 
1. As a result of Japan's reflection over the past war,all hostilities would end 
between the two countries.The communique said in preamble and Article 1 as follows; 
The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the 
serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through 
war, and deeply reproaches itself. “The abnormal state of affairs that has 
hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is 
terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.②  
2. The PRC was recognized as the “sole legal government” of China, and Japan 
agreed to cut off all political relations established with Taiwan (the Republic of China) 
since 1952. Article 2 of the Communique said; The Government of Japan recognizes 
the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of 
China. 
3. China abandoned all demands for war reparations from Japan. 
Article 5 of the Communique said; The Government of the People's Republics of 
China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the 
Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan. 
4. The inclusion of an article, implicating the Soviet Union, opposed to any 
                                                             
１５  Takeyiri Memorumdom, in Isii Akira, Zhu Jianrong, Soeya Yoshihide, Lin Xiaoguang eds., Kiroku to 
Kosho-Nitchukokkouseijouka・Nitchuheiwayukou- jouyakuteiketu Koushou(Negotiations Leading Up to 
Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization and Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship: Records 
and Historical Analysis), Iwanami Shoten, 2003.  
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country’s attempt to gain hegemony over the Asian Pacific region. Article 7 of the 
Communique said; Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of 
countries to establish such hegemony. 
5. Japan cut all political ties to Taiwan in accordance with Article VIII of the 
Potsdam Agreement. However, the Communique did not mention the “Taiwan 
question,” which was left up to such comments made by Foreign Minister Ohira 
Masayoshi as；  
 “Diplomatic relations with the ruling government of Taiwan will come 
to an end,” “In the future as well, we do not hold to [the idea of] ‘two Chinas’ 
nor do we have any inclination of backing the ‘Taiwanese independent 
movement’” (written statement by Ohira Masayoshi at the last summit talks), 
and “As a result of the normalization of relations between Japan and China, 
any further continuation of the peace treaty between Japan and the 
Nationalist Republic of China is meaningless and we consider it defunct.”１６ 
3. How to Evaluate Normalization 
【 from Japanese side】  Despite being a by-product of rapprochement 
between China and the United States, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 
1972 marked the first time since the 19th century that equality and peace was 
established between the two countries---in only four days of negotiations! However, 
looking back, one cannot avoid seeing the many problems stemming from this 
negotiation. 
  On the Japanese side, the government, especially its foreign relations sector, 
was deeply concerned about how to legitimize its diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China government on Taiwan since 1952. 
There was not even the narrowest overview about how it was going to relate to 
the Mainland and no serious questioning about whether normalization marked the 
final solution to problems surrounding the Sino-Japanese War.  
Concerning what originally should have been the most outstanding problems: i.e., 
war reparations and the US-Japan Security Treaty, China chose not to pursue the 
former and not to bring up the latter. 
The only problem left for the summit talks to solve was the Taiwan question. On 
the last day of those talks, Tanaka out and out told Zhou, “I came here with a strange 
resolve that the question of Taiwan was a Japanese domestic problem, particularly 
within the confines of the Liberal Democratic Party…because of the long history of 
relations between our two countries, I was prepared for a comparable amount of 
                                                             
１６  For the Sino-Japanese Joint Communique, see China Division, Asia Bureaou,Japan Foreign 
Office,Nitchukankei Kihonshiryoushu 1949-1997 (Basic Sources on Sino-Japanese Relations: 1949-1997),  
Kazankai, 1998; for Ohira’s memo and press conference, see ibid,Kiroku to Koushou.  
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difficulty.１ ７。  
In an interview conducted ten years later, Tanaka reiterated, “It was a domestic 
rather than a diplomatic problem. Over the one hundred years since the Meiji 
Restoration, every cabinet has faced the same vexing problem. The fact that 
Sino-Japanese problems have developed into a large cancer growth within Japan is 
not healthy for this country. If we were to solve those problems, we could reduce all 
the existing domestic difficulties by about two-thirds.”１ ８。  
Here we see clearly the true grit of Japanese diplomacy: never forget that 
domestic politics gets top priority. 
 
【Were historical issues resolved?】  Secondly, one can observe that the 
Japanese government and its Foreign office at the time probably figured that the 
negotiations marked the final solution to the problems confronting the two countries 
regarding the Sino-Japanese War---which have come to be known as “our historical 
issues.” After all, in the Communique, China accepted Japan’s “remorse” over the 
past and forwent demands for war reparations. 
As expressed by Foreign Office Treaty Bureau Chief Takashima Masao at the 
stage of the first foreign ministerial level talks, “It is my hope that the problems 
related to settling abnormal relations between Japan and China in the past, including 
the War, will all be solved by the present talks and resulting Communique, thus 
eliminating any more backward-looking tasks.”１ ９。  
However, is it really possible or feasible to “settle all” the misery, damage and 
emotional scars caused by fifteen years of military invasion and occupation in a 
couple of days of negotiations and a resulting Communique? 
Should not the deep significance embedded in the short phrase “forgo 
reparations” have conjured up a feeling that there were problems still to solve? 
The reason why the “pattern of a China demanding apologies for the War on the 
basis of the emotional state of its people and a Japan declaring ‘everything is solved’ 
on the basis of law”２ ０  has continued to the present day can be attributed to the lack 
of “historical consciousness” on the part of Japanese negotiators in 1972. 
 
【political solution】   Thirdly, let us compare the situation to the process of 
US-China rapprochement.Unlike the US-China case, the normalization of 
Sino-Japanese relations was achieved in just four days, but despite differences in pace, 
both sets of negotiations constituted “political solutions" to the problems at hand.  
In the case of the US, Nixon and his chief strategist Kissinger had decided to 
                                                             
１７  Ibid. ,”Kiroku to Koushou”. 
１８  For Memoirs of Tanaka Kakuei, see Yanagida Kunio, Nihon wa Moeteiruka?(Is Japan Burning?)”, 
Koudansha , 1983.   
１９  Ibid., Kiroku to Koushou. 
２０  Yiokibe Makoto ed., Sengo Hihon Gaikoushi-New Edition(History of Postwar Japanese Diplomacy, 
New Edition), Yuhikaku,  2006. 
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bypass both the State Department and public opinion and go the route of top secret 
talks. In the case of Japan, as well, strong political leadership was assumed by both 
Tanaka and Ohira. According to Hashimoto 恕 , China Section chief at the time, the 
mainstream thinking at the Foreign Office was still embracing “ two Chinas," 
resulting in its opposition to normalization with the Mainland at the cost of severed 
relations with Taiwan.２ １   
The greatest difference between Japan and the US, on the other hand, was the 
decision by Tanaka Kakuei to embark on a political solution to normalization based on 
widespread public support, including that of the pro-China faction (a.k.a. “the 
well-diggers”) within the Liberal Democratic Party and of the business community, 
which was enjoying a “China boom” at the time. It may even be said that Tanaka 
obtained the premiership on the strength of his clear statements in favor of 
normalization. 
Soeya Yoshihide,an expert of Sino-Japanese relations, has argued that Japan, 
which during the postwar era never attained the status of a “world power" on the level 
of the US or China due to its stigma as a former military aggressor-cum-loser, refused 
to play the strategic game on their level and was in turn left out, thus “having to lean 
towards quick normalization in the wake of US-China rapprochement." In addition, 
during the China-Japan negotiations “solutions were reached for the most part by 
China showing understanding about Japanese demands," Soeya observed. 
In contrast to their counterparts in the US-China negotiations, “Japanese leaders 
chose to understood normalization in the light of domestic politics and the 
international legal aspects of the existing treaty with the Nationalist Republic,” 
indicating “Japan’s postwar character,” “a lack of strategic sense.”２ ２   
In my opinion, the problem lies not in a lack of strategic sense, but rather one of 
diplomatic sense in trying to solve by far the most important foreign relations 
problem in Japan’s postwar history like it was a domestic political issue which, by the 
way, has continued unsolved for over thirty years now. 
 
【 from Chinese Side】  Turning to the Chinese side, if one looks in detail at 
its rapprochement with the US and normalization of relations with Japan, from 
China’s standpoint, the latter appears as an extrapolation of the former, in a scenario 
the motivation for which stems from 1) strategic concerns about the Soviet Union and 
2) putting an end to Japan-Taiwan relations once and for all. The “strategic sense” 
in such a scenario may have raised China’s strategic status in international politics, 
but it also brought about compromises with Japan and showed a brand of diplomacy 
having little or no relevance to the needs of its people.  
                                                             
２１  Ibid., Kiroku to Koushou. 
２２  Soeya Yoshihide, “US-China Relations and Japanese Diplomacy During the 1970s” in Nenpou 
Seijigaku, 1997—Kikino Nihon Gaikou 1970nendai(Political Science Annual 1997: Japan’s Diplomatic 
Peril of the 1970s),Iwanami Shoten,1998 年、Soeya,“From US-China Rapprochement to Sino-Japanese 
Diplomatic Normalization,” in ibid.,Kiroku to Koushou.   ”  
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Let us consider first the problem of war reparations, the abandonment of which, 
as we shall see, solidified the strategy of the top Chinese leaders. 
It was only after the official visit of Prime Minister Tanaka was confirmed that 
Communist Party cadres and the Chinese public learned of such an important decision, 
for it was around the end of July 1972 that Zhou Enlai drew up a manifesto explaining 
the reparations question to the nation. 
According to Chinese expert Li Zhengtang and others, Zhou's argument consisted 
of three main points. 
1. Since prior to the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, Taiwan’s 
Jiang Jieshi had already relinquished China’s claim to reparations, the Communist 
Party must not show any less magnanimity. 
2. In order to revive diplomatic relations with China, Japan had to first cut off 
relations with Taiwan. If the central government took a tolerant attitude concerning 
reparations, the Japanese would follow suit concerning its relations with Taiwan. 
3. If China had demanded reparations, the burden of payment would 
ultimately have fallen upon the Japan people as a whole, and heaped even more 
hardship on their lives. That is not the kind of friendship China wanted to form with 
them.２ ３  
On 14 September, a gathering of 10,000 was convened in Shanghai, and its 
decision was broadcast to 140 thousand party cadres across the country.  
 The decision said; 
many of you will probably be angered to see the Hi-no-Maru [Japanese 
flag] again…However, the Japanese people are, like us, also victims of 
militaristic aggression and war, and thus should not be forced to take 
responsibility for the crimes committed by Japan against China in the 
past…We call upon the whole nation to understand the significance of our 
invitation to Prime Minister Tanaka and make preparations to entertain his 
diplomatic party.“２４ 
In other words, during its negotiations with Japan in 1972, the Chinese 
leadership was mainly concerned with cutting off political relations between Japan 
and Taiwan, and in the end, the most effective means for achieving that goal turned 
out be the abandonment of claims to war reparations. 
According to Zhang Xiangshan, “Because of Chairman Mao’s extremely strong 
influence on Chinese public opinion, no one dared criticize his decision to relinquish 
reparations.” ２ ５  
                                                             
２３  Li Zhengtang,Zhongguoren Guanzhude Huati: Zhanzheng Suopei (An Issues of Concern to Chinese: 
War Reparations),  Xinhua Chubanshe, 1999. 
２４  Luo Pinghan，Zhongguo Duirizhengce yu Zhongri Bangjiaozhengchanhua(China’s Japan Policy and 
Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization, Shishichubanshe, 2000. 
２５  Zhang Xiangshan(Suzuki Eiji Translation),Nitchukankei no Kanken to Kenshou—Kokkouseijouka 
30nen no Ayumi (Observation and Analysis of Sino-Japanese Relations: Thirty Years of Diplomatic 
 14
However, in 2005, three years after Zhang’s disclosure, in the midst of the 
anti-Japanese demonstrations, the internet was suddenly filled with invective over 
Mao and Zhou’s fundamental policy towards Japan first conceived in the early 1950s, 
including their distinguishing Japanese militarists from the masses and their 
relinquishing war reparations claims.  
 
【Balance of Power strategy】   China’s normalization of relations with 
Japan, which was born out of rapprochement with the United States, was strongly 
characterized by strategic decision-making and a belief in the idea of “the balance of 
power,” especially with regard to the Soviet Union.  
This situation is best indicated by a comment made by a very jolly Mao to Henry 
Kissinger on 17 February 1973. 
 “It’s been a year since President Nixon’s visit and already we are in 
agreement over the hegemony issue. Our relations with Japan are also 
progressing since we changed our fundamental thinking about them. 
China now looks upon Japan as an important force in the [anti-Soviet] 
struggle against hegemony…“ 
 “We are all part of a united front now, wouldn’t you say? The US, Japan, 
China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Europe…”２６ 
Mao was under the impression that all the countries named above were members 
of some united anti-Soviet bloc. 
Furthermore, in his meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira on 5 January 
1974, Mao revealed his idea of the combined utilizable international power of 
countries including the Unites States and Japan that would resist Soviet expansion as 
“one large fragment.” ２ ７。  
In sum, Mao and Zhou’s decision to normalize relations with Japan arose mainly 
from strategic considerations regarding the US, USSR and Taiwan, not from any 
analysis or practical policy towards Japan per se. 
In particular, their failure to seek a popular consensus over war reparations 
would breed discontent in China under a growing atmosphere of freedom of speech 
from the 1990s on.  
 
【 Mao-Zhou’s “liangfen-lun” 】    Turning to Mao and Zhou’s idea of 
distinguishing Japanese militarists from the masses〔 liangfen-lun〕, as a moral reason 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Normalization, Sanwashogeki,2002. 
２６  Gong Li,“From Rapprochement of Sino-US Relations to ‘(Anti-USSR) United Front Strategy‘”, 
Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Xuebao,  No.2, 2002. 
２７  Ibid.   
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why reparations should not be sought, to begin with, it was in 1952 that China 
embarked on “Japanese operations” with the establishment of an official liaison 
section headed by Zhou and put in charge of Liao Chengzhi; and 1953 marked the 
inception of the policy direction followed by Mao and Zhou that the responsibility for 
Japan’s invasion of China lay in the government and a faction of militarists, which 
should be distinguished from the Japanese people as a whole. ２ ８  
The Communist Party’s first five-point policy towards Japan issued in March 
1955 called for opposition to the revival of militarism, distancing Japan from the US 
and “treating the Japanese people with understanding and sympathy.２ ９  This policy 
has not changed in official circles to the present day. 
Secondly, the decision to relinquish claims to war reparations was made in 
January 1964 (according to the article  written by Zhu Jianrong in 1992), when Zhou 
took steps to suppress (under the auspices of Mao) calls for payments emanating from 
among the Chinese leadership  for the following reasons:  
1. Neither Taiwan nor the United States were claiming such 
reparations. 
2.  Any payments themselves would do little to stimulate the Chinese 
economy. 
3.  Reparations defied Mao’s thought to distinguish between militarists 
and the Japanese people they victimized. 
4. Demand for large sums of reparations would delay negotiations with 
the Japanese over normalization of diplomatic relations.３０ 
The above Chinese policy strategy can be looked upon as quite honorable and was 
indeed welcomed with gratitude by Japan.  
Be that as it may, the decision to relinquish claims to reparations does not reflect 
in any way the voice of the people who suffered at the hands of their Japanese 
occupiers during the War, not to mention the fact that they only heard of the decision 
during Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit. In the convincing words of Zhu Jiangrong,  
 “ There is the belief in China that the decision by leaders like Mao and 
Zhou “not to seek reparations” on ideological grounds was too hasty, in that 
public opinion was not sought.This belief forms the background of recent 
efforts to seek reparations… 
 [It is fine that Sino-Japanese relations are in good standing, but]when 
                                                             
２８  Wu Xuewen, Fengyuyinqing－  Wosuojinglide Zhongriguanxi(Ce Sera-Sera:  My Journey Through 
Sino-Japanese Relations),Shijiezhishi Chubanshe, 2000?  
２９  Ibid., Zhang Xiangshan. 
３０  Zhu Jianrong “Why China Abstained from War Reparations”, Gaikou foram, Oct., 1992. 
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one hears complaints from Japan about China being ungrateful for ODA 
allotments, the reaction from China is that ODA was supposed to be a 
gesture in response to the abandonment of war reparations. China’s 
relinquishing such claims should be etched in the hearts of the Japanese 
people, and ODA from Japan should be warmly greeted in China as how the 
Japanese feel.  ３１ 
Therefore, it is in this sense that the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 
1972 revealed a “lack of strategy” on the part of Japanese leaders, who were concerned 
only with their own domestic agendas in a display of incredibly poor diplomatic skills, 
while the Chinese leadership, despite a powerful display of international political 
savvy and basic moral fortitude, lacked any sense of pragmatism and was out of step 
with public opinion at home. 
To put it one way, Chinese diplomacy was replete with Wilsonian idealism, 
Marxist internationalism and the ideals of traditional Chinese kingship. 
Nevertheless, Japanese leaders at that time and since the 1990s have failed to 
understand, reflect upon or respect China’s diplomatic gestures towards Japan at that 
time. Indeed, one must again marvel at the completely different diplomatic character 
and style displayed by both countries in norlization negotiations. 
 
【views of Jin XideJin 】  Let us turn here to the discussion about the 
so-called “1972 Sino-Japanese regime,” which is still legally in effect after over thirty 
years. There is strong recent opinion in China that it is time for both countries to 
return to the fundamentals of the “72 Regime” as the prototype in any future 
relations. 
One example is Jin Xide, an expert in Sino-Japanese relations at the Institute of 
Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who has termed the Taiwan 
question and the historical issues existing between the two countries “very crucial and 
delicate problems,” two fundamental preconditions of normalization in 1972, which 
face “very important challenges” today in the 21st century. 
According to Jin, ３ ２  the “Regime of 1972” constitutes a consensus formed 
between the two countries about the principles for dealing with such problems as 
Taiwan, history, regional security and territory. It is the culmination of the mutual 
experience, lessons learned and national interest considerations of leaders in both 
countries. 
Therefore, let us review what actually makes up the “Regime of 1972.” 
To begin with, there is the “historical issues” part, in which, according to Jin, 
“both Japan, in reflection upon its war of aggression towards China, and China, in its 
                                                             
３１ Zhu Jianrong ,“Implications for the 21st Century Pioneered by Our Predecessors”, in ibid., Kiroku to 
Koushou.  
３２  Jin Xide, Zhongri Guanxi:Fujiao 30 Zhounian de Sikao (Sino-Japanese Relations: Reflection on the 
Past 30 Years Since Reconciliation, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2002.  
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gesture of friendship not to seek war reparations, promote healthy mutual relations in 
the spirit of stepping into the future through the looking glass of history.”  
And if we can go as far as to assume that the abandonment of war reparations 
was a proposal made by the Chinese side on the condition that Japan reflect upon its 
reckless and aggressive past, then, as Jin argues, the series of events that have 
occurred in Japan---namely, worship of war dead by prime ministers at the Yasukuni 
Shrine, comments by cabinet members, etc. denying Japan’s military actions 
constituted aggression, and history textbooks that “tend to legitimize Japan’s war 
efforts”---fly in the face of such conditions. 
Secondly, concerning the “Taiwan question,” which is related to the 1972 
Agreement that 1) “Japan recognizes the People’s Republic as the sole legal 
government of China, 2) Taiwan is a part of the Republic, 3) the Taiwan question is a 
Chinese domestic affair, and 4) Japan will no longer conduct formal relations with 
Taiwan,” 
Jin asserts that the fact of Japan becoming clearer about its support of the 
United States policy of involvement in Taiwan since the 1990s, the formation of 
confabs involving Taiwanese and Japanese politicians, and the redefinition of the 
US-Japan Security Treaty all signify a strong move away from what was agreed upon 
in 1972.  
 
【 Is 1972 Agreement unchangeable? 】    Concerning the permanency or 
durability of the Regime of 1972, Jin states 
 “[It] ended one hundred years of feuding between the two countries, 
including a Cold War-related conflict during the final twenty years of that 
era. We can foresee no other framework to replace it completely now or in 
the future; and talk of going beyond it is not to be taken lightly.” 
While the points that Jin makes are in themselves unassailable, the 
circumstances he describes is not that simple, for the “Regime of 1972” itself is by no 
means flawless and the huge changes that have occurred in both the international 
environment as a whole and power relationships between China and Japan, in 
particular, cannot be ignored. 
I have already outlined above problems of China’s motivation and Japan’s lack of 
strategy, resulting in neither party being able to view accurately the long-range 
ramifications of the complex, emotion issues that were facing them, but a more 
important problem is what has happened during the thirty years since the agreement 
was reached: for example, such completely unforeseen occurrences as China’s 
concerns about the Soviet Union ending with the Cold War, democratization in 
Taiwan and the concomitant move for national independence shaking the foundations 
of the “one China” principle, changes that have occurred in Japan’s political structure 
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and generational composition since the 1990s, Chinese public opinion being 
strengthened by a policy of openness both at home and abroad, and probably most 
important, China’s transformation from a regional to a world economic power, thus 
changing the Sino-Japanese power balance in the process. 
These comments by no means indicate any criticism on the part of this writer of 
the 1972 normalization agreement, just that everything was by no means perfect, 
meaning that the perpetuity of the “Regime of 1972” has come into serious doubt, 
what with the fact that since the late 1990s, Sino-Japanese relations have entered an 
era of structural fluctuation, and since the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005, an 
era of renewed rivalry. 
The time has come for a redefinition of the “spirit of 1972” and a new 
“agreement” in that spirit. 
II. The 1980s: The “Honeymoon Years” 
1. Reform and Open-up in China 
【Honneymoon years】   The 1970s set the tone for mutual “ friendship," 
which while sincerely felt by both sides, was filled with expectations, as roughly hewn 
as they were, of a new Sino-Japanese relationship. China's deep worries about Japan's 
new relations with the United States and the existence of a Soviet threat, combined 
with Japan's response, created what can be called an “era of strategic friendship."  
China upheld the US-Japan Security Treaty, which she had criticized so vehemently in 
the past, and even expressed approval for a build-up of Japanese military might. Thus, 
in August 1978 the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, filled with rhetoric 
opposing regional hegemony, was signed. 
 However, during the 1980s, when China conducted a series of reforms leading 
to openness, Japanese policy was fundamentally orchestrated in support of Chinese 
modernization, on which China rested large hopes. 
Specifically, Sino-Japanese relations entered what seemed to be an era of 
progress, when in 1982 China came up with a modernization plan four times ｏｆ 
GDP scale of previous attempts and embarked on an “independent, autonomous 
foreign policy“ by a planned restructuring of its relations with the US and USSR. 
It was a era under pro-Japanese leadership,Hu Yaobang, in which Japan lent 
assistance and China gladly accepted it, despite trouble in the areas of Japanese 
school textbooks, Yasukuni Shrine visits by prime ministers, and the Guanghua 
Dormitory Incident. Two countries recognized that there were “donor-recipient 
relationship" between them.It was a time that everyone including the US leaders 
welcomed “a strong and stable China,“ a veritable “golden age", a "honeymoon" to cite 
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Ezra Vogel and Tanaka Akihiko.３ ３  
 
【Deng‘s visit to Japan】   In October 1978, Deng Xiaoping came to Japan for 
the purpose of ratifying the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and became the first 
Chinese leader to meet the emperor, who stated, “Despite the unfortunate events that 
have occurred during the long history of relations between our two nations, it is now 
time to put away the past and promote mutual goodwill in a long and lasting 
relationship of peace." 
When the subject of US-Japan relations and Japan’s defensive capabilities came 
up in talks with Prime Minister Fukuda, Deng expressed understanding about the 
US-Japan Security Agreement and Japan’s military buildup, while at the same time 
praising Japan’s efforts to assist the world’s developing countries.３ ４  
What should be pointed out here is Deng taking a long look around and 
commenting, “There is a lot to be learned from the great Japanese nation,” adding in 
one press conference “and much technology and capital to borrow,” and at another, 
“we are open to the possibility of foreign loans from Japan.” 
When asked of his impressions of the Shinkansen bullet train he was riding from 
a VIP guided tour of the Shin-Nittetsu’s Kimitsu Foundary (courtesy of Board 
Chairman Inayama Yoshihiro) in Chiba Prefecture bound for Kyoto and a tour of 
Panasonic’s television facility in Osaka (courtesy of former Board Chairman 
Matsushita Konosuke), Deng replied, “It’s like running with the help of the wind, 
we’re running, too, and need as much help as we can get.”３ ５ Deng’s request for a 
boost would symbolize a new step in economic relations between the two countries. 
Incidentally, from the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement (February 
1978), an oil-crisis plagued Japan’s prayers that exports of plant and equipment 
would be met with imports of Chinese oil were answered, creating a trade structure 
between the two countries that grew by leaps and bounds.  
 
【China cancelled contracts of plants】    However, it was also a time of 
growing economic friction between the two “ friends," as a China strapped for capital 
was forced to announce the cancellation of part of the US$8 billion dollar plant 
purchases it contracted during 1978-9. In February 1979, the Chinese government 
announced that due to an inability to pay costs, it was putting a portion of the 
contracts signed for the Baoshan Steel Foundry (Baogang) project on hold. Then in 
January 1981, it was announced that the second phase of the Baoshan Project and 
contracts for the construction of petrochemical plants in such locations as Nanking, 
Shandong and Beijing had been cancelled, to the tune of US$3 billion. 
                                                             
３３  Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, Tanaka Akihiko eds, The Golden Age of the U.S.-China- Japan Triangle, 
1972-1989,Harvard Univ. Press, 2002 
３４  Asahi Shinbun, 1978.10.24 
３５  Beijing Zhoubao,  No.43, 1978. 
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A cloud had appeared on the horizon in the form of China’s haste in building 
economic relations with Japan without adequate capitalization planning.  
The problem was solved by financial assistance from Japan in March 1981 and 
China’s economic adjustment policy. These stabilized the Deng regime and paved the 
way for its open, liberal foreign affairs policy. 
The Baogang Project marked the tone of Sino-Japanese relations during the 
1980s, with the creation of a Chinese image of Japan as a helping hand in the task of 
modernization． It was a time that Daichi-no-Ko, Yamazaki Toyoko’s novel of a 
Japanese youth left behind in northeastern China at the end of the war, raised in a 
Chinese foster home, employed as an engineer at the Baogang facility and given the 
opportunity to reunite with his Japanese father, was made into a TV drama series and 
enjoyed top ratings among both Japanese and Chinese viewers. 
2. Japanese Aid and Chinese Modernization Policy  
【Acceptance of Japanese loans】  It was at the December 1978 the 3rd 
concongress of the Central Committee of CCP that farewell was bid to the Mao Zedong 
era,with such decisions as “the movement of our entire center of gravity to building 
the economy.” Then its 12th National of the CCP in 1982 announced the “four 
modernizations policy,” which called for a quadrupling of industrial and agricultural 
output over the next twenty years and raising the living standard of the people to 
“about the middle level.” 
From that time on, the Chinese economy has continued to grow, achieving the 
quadrupling goal in 1995, five years earlier than expected. 
“Four Modernization Project” will need tremendous funds. At what time and with 
what intention did Chinese leadership decide to introduce foreign capital?  The 
process began in May 1978 when on the basis of a fact-finding tour of Europe 
conducted by Deputy Prime-Minister Gu Mu, head of the National-Planning 
Committee, Deng proposed, 
1. the promotion of plant and equipment imports, 
2. the necessity to decide on whether foreign loans would be requested for 
building the economy 
3. that time is of the essence. 
Japan was the first country to respond. In September 1978, during a visit to 
China by Japanese members of the business community, China-Japan Economic 
Association Chairman Inayama Yoshihiro (Shin’nittetsu Board Chairman) told 
Chinese officials that the Japanese government was ready with ODA funding for them, 
and Keidanren Chairman Doko Toshio explained yen-based foreign loans. 
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This was followed by Deng’s comment during his Japan visit mentioned 
previously and a year-end press conference in Hong Kong given by Chinese Foreign 
Trade Minister Li Qiang, who stated, “China is prepared to accept government loans 
or private sector funding under the appropriate conditions.” 
According the memoirs of a Chinese foreign trade bureau official, after Kimura 
Yichizo, chairman of the Kansai Headquarters of the Japan External Trade 
Organization, advised Gu Mu to accept government funding from Japan in May 1979, 
Gu ordered him to consult with the Japanese Embassy about aid conditions, upon 
which he discovered that China qualified by virtue of its 350 dollar per capita GDP, 
resulting in the start of project planning to that effect.３ ６。Gu then met with Prime 
Minister Ohira in Japan in September to formally request yen-based loans for the first 
time. 
Although China had received foreign loans from the Soviet Union several times 
during the 1950s, this was the first time it had sought aid from the Western bloc.To 
introduce capital from a capitalist country, especially in the form of government loans, 
must have required a serious leap of faith and desperation. 
 
【Ohira‘s three conditions for aid to Chinaw】   During his visit to China 
during December 1979 Prime Minister Ohira promised to lend 50 billion yen during 
fiscal year 1979 for six infrastructure-related construction projects in such top 
priority areas as seaports, railways and hydraulic power facilities, marking the 
beginning of four such loans amounting to 3 trillion yen over a 16-year period. 
In Beijing,Ohira outlined three conditions for Japanese aid to China, which also 
highlighted Sino-Japanese relations in general during the 80s: No military-related aid 
would be given, maintain an economic balance with neighboring countries and 
relations between us must not be exclusionary.３ ７。  
First of all, it was the intent of the Japanese to support an open and free China; 
secondly, there was the feeling of giving something back in return for China’s 
relinquishing claims to war reparations; and finally, the Japanese government was 
fundamentally dedicated to maintaining a balance among the countries, beginning 
with ASEAN, it was presently giving aid. 
The Sino-Japanese economic cooperation which characterized the 1980s and 
early 1990s surpassed the framework for Asian countries up to that time, in that it 
went beyond mere post-WWII mop-up diplomacy, and in this sense, marked an 
important turning point for Japanese diplomacy.３ ８。  
There is no doubt, however, that such diplomacy, while supplying a now realistic 
China with huge untied loans in order to keep it that way, had its eye clearly fixed on 
                                                             
３６  Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), 2005.12.27 
３７  Ibid., Nitchukankei Kihon Shiryoushu.  
３８  Tanaka Akihiko,  Nitchu Kankei: 1945-1990 (Sino-Japanese Relations: 1945-1990), University of 
Tokyo Press, 1991. 
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the prize of Chinese cooperation in fossil fuel development for Japan’s security needs 
in the area of energy. 
 
【Hu Yaobang and Japan】   No honeymoon can be successful without a loving 
partner. Japan had two during the 1980s in the guise of Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang.On his visit to Japan in March 1982, Prime Minister Zhao emphasized the 
three principles of peace and friendship, co-prosperity and long-term stability in 
relations between the two countries. 
At the 12th CCP Congress of 1982, where China declared “independence and 
autonomy" from the strategic pertnership with the United States and the USSR, Hu, 
the Party's General Secretary, included Japan in his address, stating, “The 
development of peace, friendship, co-prosperity and lasting stability between China 
and Japan are not only the common wishes of our two peoples, but will also serve to 
stabilize and pacify the whole Asian-Pacific region." 
Hu made his visit to Japan in November 1983, during which in talks with then 
Prime Minister Nakasone, Nakasone added a fourth principle of “mutual trust" and 
proposed the formation of the 21st Century Sino-Japanese Friendship Committee, 
both of which Hu expressed agreement with. Hu was not to be outdone, saying that he 
would like to invite 3000 Japanese youth to spend one week in China. And so the 
youth exchange began, with Nakasone, during his China visit of November 1986, 
reciprocating with an invitation to 500 Chinese every year. 
It was during talks between Nakasone and Zhao in March 1984 that the granting 
of a second, more prodigious, government loan of 470 billion yen was revealed. It was 
a time when China was expanding its open up policy with such projects as the 
designation of fourteen most-favored (reduced tariff) coastal cities, including Dalian, 
which promised to broaden Sino-Japanese economic relations. 
Such goodwill was dampened, however, by Nakasone's 1985 decision to worship 
at Yasukuni Shrine, some 18 September demonstrations protesting Japan's economic 
advance onto the Mainland and infuriating school textbook content. 
Through it all, Hu remained the faithful wedding partner, gracing the honeymoon 
with a tolerant attitude over Nakasone's Yasukuni visit and keeping a cool head in the 
midst of the second schoolbook uproar in 1986. 
As a matter of a fact, it is rumored that Hu's “infatuation with Japan" was one of 
the causes triggering his “resignation" in January 1987. On that occasion Deng stated 
“Hu made six mistakes…[the fifth of which] was inviting President Nakasone without 
the CCP politburo‘s permission."３ ９  
Dealing in policy regarding Japan seems to be a very delicate matter in China, if 
leaders there can to lose their jobs over the decisions they make in that area. 
                                                             
３９  Yomiuri Shinbun, 1989.1.23 
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3. Government Loans 
【Four times loans to China】  The Japanese government issued loans to China 
once for every five-year plan issued by the latter between 1979 and 1996 to the tune 
of . 
① 330.9 billion ｙｅｎ year for seven projects （1979-84）, 
② 470 billion ｙｅｎ for 17 projects (1984-89), 
③ 810 billion ｙｅｎ for 52 projects (1990-95) 
④ 969.8 billion yen for 93 projects (1996-2000). 
Economic assistance to China consisted of three forms: repayable loans, 
gratuitous loans and technological aid. 
Some 90% of the aid consisted of long-term, low interest loans (3.427 trillion yen 
in formal contracts as of 2003), while the 5% occupied by gratuitous loans (141.6 
billion in limited allotments) went for a memorial hospital and cultural center in 
Beijing and other education and welfare-related facilities around the country. The 
remaining 5% in technological aid came to 144.6 billion in expenses paid by the JICA. 
４ ０   
 
【China is the top recipient】   Table 1 lists the top five countries receiving 
government loans from Japan according to accumulated debt as of 2003. China's 
second place standing can be deceiving, since it occupied the top yearly position each 
year since 1993, meaning that it held a privileged position within Japan's ODA 
pecking order. 
 
                                                             
４０  ODA 2005 White Paper appearing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index.html 
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Table 1: Japan’s Top Five Debtor Countries: 2003 
(in million yen, total to 2003) 
Ranking Country Amount of Debt 
1 Indonesia 3,822,865 
2 Peoples Republic of China 3,047,181 
3 India 2,246,189 
4 Philippines 2,032,674 
5 Thai 2,009,300 
Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 ODA White Paper. 
 
On the other hand, Japan continues as the largest contributor of aid to China 
among the DAC [Development Assistance Committee of OECD] members. 
The yearly Japanese share of the total foreign government loans incurred by 
China between 1979 and 1995 is shown in Table 2(total share 41.9%), indicating the 
important role played by Japan in building a modernized China during the 1980s to 
middle of 90s. 
 
Table 2: Japan’s Share of the Major Foreign Government Loans Made to China 
During 1979-1999 
Rank Country 
Amount 
(US$100 
million) 
Item No. % of Total 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
20 
 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Spain 
Italy 
 
US 
 
97.27 
22.89 
19.56 
18.32 
16.21 
 
0.23 
 
72 
42 
80 
107 
47 
 
1 
 
41.91 
9.86 
8.42 
7.89 
6.98 
 
0.10 
 Ｔｏｔａｌ 223.08 1351 100 
 【Ｓｏｕｒｃｅ:Lin Xiaoguang，Japanese Government Assistance and Sino-Japanese Relations（Ｃｈｉｎｅｓ
ｅ）, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe、2003、ｐ．381】  
 
【China’s Estimation of Japanese ODA】  China has evaluated the 
assistance it has received in proportion to its generosity. While it is not expressed out 
loud, Japan's ODA is not thought of very differently from the war reparations China 
refused to claim. However, China has never taken ODA for granted as relinquished 
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war reparations and has not even mentioned or implied the two as existing in the 
same context. There have been some subtle inferences, like Deng's comment to 
Komeito party chairman Yano Junnya during his visit to Japan in June 1987;  
“From an historical perspective, Japan should be doing more to help 
China develop.Let’s face it, Japan probably owes more to China than any 
other country in the world. When we ｎｏｒｍａｌｉｚｅｄ diplomatic relations, we 
didn’t put reparations on the negotiating table.”４１ 
One should keep in mind, however, that Deng's statement was made during a 
time of tension between the two countries over the incident involving Guanghualiao, 
the Nationalist-China-owned dormitory in Kyoto. 
Otherwise, “China is grateful for all the economic cooperation that Japan has 
given us" (Chairman Jiang Zemin during Japan visit, November 1998) and “I would 
like to praise Japan's ODA program, which has helped the Chinese economy develop 
as well as promote Sino-Japanese economic relations. We are especially grateful for 
the government loans we have received…" (Premier Zhu Rongji, on tour Fall 2000)４ ２ , 
and so on. 
Chinese academics as well have come forward with a general affirmative outlook 
about the benefits bestowed on their country through Japanese-sponsored ODA.４ ３  
Incidentally, Japan used ODA as a trump card in August 1995, when it decided to 
freeze all new gratuitous aid in protest over China's implementation of its twice 
underground nuclear tests. 
The “donor-recipient" relationship between the two countries symbolized by ODA 
continued for almost fifteen years, until nagging economic stagnation in the patron's 
backyard forced Japan to reevaluate the relationship in 2000. In December of the year, 
the 21st Century Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation Confab (Miyazaki Isao, 
chairman) stated that while Japanese assistance to China had been highly praised by 
all parties concerned, it was time to reevaluate the relationship given the state of the 
Japanese economy, the performance of the Chinese economy and changes in world 
public opinion regarding the nature of foreign aid, and proposed that; 
1. aid priority be shifted to such areas as environmental, social, health and 
human resources development, 
2. support be channeled towards the development of a market economy, 
and  
                                                             
４１   Asahi Shinbun, 1987.6.5 
４２   Asahi Shinbun, 2000.10.14 
４３   Zhang Guang, Riben Duiwai Yuanzhuzhengce Yanjiu (Policy Studies on Japanese Foreign Aid), Japan 
Center of Nankai University, Tianjing Renmin Chubanshe, 1996; Jin Xide, Riben Zhengfu Kaifayuanzhu 
(Japanese Government Aid for Development , Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000; Lin Xiaoguang, 
Rebenzhengfu kaifayuanzhu yu Zhongri Guanxi(Japanese Government Aid for Development and 
Sino-Japanese Relations, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe,2003. 
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3. more care be taken about the ODA provision banning the military use of 
funds.４４。 
In August 2003 the Japanese ODA guidelines written in 1992 were revised to 
include 
 a balance between development and the environment, 
 avoidance of support for military uses or international conflicts, 
 attention to military outlays or weapons imports to developing countries, 
and 
 sensitivity to democratization, market economy and human rights records 
of developing countries. 
Needless to say, China was no exception to such guidelines. 
 
【Tiananmen Incident and Grant Aid】    Towards the late 1980s, although the 
underlying problems of history, the Guanghua Dormitory incident and economic 
friction were starting to take their toll on the “honeymoon," both parties avoided 
direct confrontation, due to the high expectations resting on the expansion of 
economic relations. 
Towards the end of the decade, in the hopes of further deepening of economic 
ties, the death of former general secretary Hu Yaobang(15 April 1989) characterized 
the year's “political season" with a Beijing demonstration to commemorate his passing 
turning ugly into a protest against the conservative faction that drove him out of 
office. Then the last days of May saw student protests in the Tiananmen Square 
opposing political corruption and inflation and calling for further democratization. 
The Tiananmen Incident had veteran conservative politicians like Wang Zhen 
and Peng Zhen fearing another “Cultural Revolution" and forcing Deng to resort to 
military action in quelling the disturbances, out of fear that compromise with the 
protestors would result in defeat like in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Japan's response to the uproar differed from the countries of the West, which 
reacted with strict sanctions in a call for the pacification of the situation at all cost. In 
a news conference the day after the start of the incident, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Shiokawa stated, “It is a shame that such a tragic state of affairs developed; we 
strongly hope that the situation will not grow any worse and that China will return to 
normalcy as soon as possible."４ ５  
On June 23rd Shiokawa announced a “government consensus” that, “The relations 
                                                             
４４  Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website link on Government Aid for 
Development(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index.html) 
４５   Ibid., Nitchukankei Kihon shiryoushu.  
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between Japan and China are very deep, both historically and culturally. We will make 
certain that there will be no changes in our existing commitment to cooperation in 
reform and liberalization of such areas as the economy.” ４ ６。  
In addition, while taking such measures as a de facto freeze (June 20) on the 
third government grant, Japan was trying to prevent China from becoming isolated at 
the Arche Summit Meeting scheduled for July. Japan was intent on regaining contact 
with China as soon as possible. Postponed proposals for the continuation of ODA were 
resumed in August, and in September a contingent from the coalition of China 
supporters in the Diet led by the LDP's Ito Masayoshi made a visit to China. 
On that occasion Deng (as head of theCentral Military Committee, CCP) told Ito, 
“We have taken due notice that Japan has expressed an attitude about the Arche 
Summit somewhat different from the other countries of the world…Friendly relations 
between our two countries must never change, no matter what happens in the world or 
what changes occur on our own domestic fronts."４ ７ , thus wooing the only developed 
country that was willing to cooperate with the Chinese agenda. 
By the spring of 1990, relations between the two countries were beginning to take 
a turn for the better, as indicated by Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro, who 
stated in the Diet during March, “It is important for the peace and stability of the 
Asian-Pacific region, and the world, for that matter, that China not be isolated, but 
maintain cooperative relations with other countries…We should resume our 
preexisting relations with China as quickly as possible.”４ ８  In the absence of personal 
contact with the West, Nakayama visited China in April 1991, followed by Prime 
Minister Kaifu that August, to which the Chinese responded with an invitation to the 
Ｅmperor, which was accepted and consummated in October 1992. 
 
【Have Japan come back to Asia?】    While the Tiananmen incident did 
immense damage to the Japanese image of China, Japan's tolerant response to it and 
the related issue of economic aid improved its image among the Chinese, as that 
country's intellectuals favorably announced during the early 1990s that “Japan had 
come home to Asia." 
A 1994 article published in Riben Xuekan, the journal of the Academy of Social 
Sciences' Institute of Japanese Studies, argued that during the late 1980s Japan “had 
transformed its view of Asia," was showing a new tendency to “come back around to 
Asia," and was moving from US-led diplomacy to a style “emphasizing Asia and 
autonomous-independent thinking." 
Articles by such leaders as Fuji-Xerox Board Chairman Kobayashi Yotaro (“The 
Asianization of Japan," Voice,Sept. 1992) and then Foreign Ministry Economic Bureau 
chief Ogura Kazuo (“Towards an ‘Asian Resurgence,'" Chuokoron ,Jul. 1993) was also 
                                                             
４６  Yomiuri Shinbun,  1989.6.24 
４７  Beijing Zhoubao, No.39, Sept 26, 1989. 
４８  Ibid., Nitchukankei Kihon Shiryoushu.  
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well received in Chinese academia.４ ９  
Furthermore, elsewhere in Asia expectations about Japan’s future role there went 
as far as speculation about a country exclusively dependent on its alliance with the US 
being open to building a multilateral security mechanism for the region. ５ ０。  
However, during the mid-90s this new image of Japan would turned cautious 
along with the structural changes that occurred in Sino-Japanese relations, due to 
such conditions as the re-definition of the US-Japan alliance, bicoastal tension in the 
Strait of Taiwan and the emergence of China as an international economic power. Let 
us look at this restructuring in more detail. 
III. Structural Changes Since the Mid-1990s 
1. China’s Emergence 
【Economic Leaning upon】   By 1995～96 the honeymoon of mutual goodwill 
and interest was over, as the massive growth in China's macro-economy created here 
and there within Japanese public opinion the image of China as a new economic rival, 
possibly even a threat in the aftermath of missile testing near the Strait of Taiwan to 
add its two cents worth to the general elections being conducted on the distant shores. 
On the other hand, 1995-96 saw a Taiwan-beleaguered China viewing Japan with 
more suspicion after the latter's “redefinition" of its security treaty with the United 
States. 
Under such circumstances, extremist nationalism came to occupy a significant 
role in public opinion in both countries. One expression of this new political trend 
was the 1996-97 dispute over the Senkaku Islands(Diaoyudao) that was started on the 
private sector level; another is the emotional responses, again on the “ordinary folks" 
level, to the seemingly limitless economic interdependency that was developing 
between the two countries, while a shift to an image of political, economic and 
strategic rivalry was forming at the same time. 
The fact of the two countries leaning heavily upon one another in the area of 
foreign trade was business as usual, when in 2005 Japan exported 80.38 billion and 
109.1 billion US$ goods and services to and from China, 8.8% and 15.8% increases, 
respectively, over the previous year. 
In Japan's total foreign trade, China ranked second in exports at 13.1% and 
topped the chart in imports at 20.7%.  
Figures 1 and Figure 2 summarize the who's who in Japan's trade partners since 
1999. After China surpassed the United States as Japan's no. 1 importer in 2001, it is 
only a matter of time until its repeats that feat on the other side of the ledger. 
                                                             
４９  Li Genan,”Japan: Asia’s Prodigal Child,”  Riben Xuekan, No.3, 1994 
５０  Zhao Guangrui,“Japan’s Gradual ‘Return’ to Asia”, Riben Xuekan,No.1, 1996. 
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Dependency goes both ways in the relationship, since any economic setback on 
one side can cause serious damage to the other and even threaten the quality of daily 
life, as seen in the SARS and Bird Flu epidemics. Since neither economics nor disease 
respect national boundaries anymore, any choice between rivalry and partnership has 
been eliminated for all intents and purposes.   
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【China's Uprisings】  In 1992 China suddenly began to rush in the direction of 
a market economy after Deng's “Conversations on a Journey South," and foreign 
capital began flowing in like waves from the China Sea. 
Three years later, the World Bank announced that China's economic performance 
in term of purchasing power was then second only to that of the United States. It was 
also a time when the “Chinese threat" hype was permeating the media in Japan. 
According to revised data published at the end of 2005, between 1978 and 2004 
China's growth rate averaged 9.6% per annum, a level unknown in the annals of world 
economic history. As of 2004, despite a per capita GDP of US$1490, which trails the 
pack at 107th in the world, in gross terms, China's GDP has surpassed Italy's, moving 
into 6th place. 
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Table 2: Gross GDP World Rankings: 2004 
Ranking GDP (US100 
million$) 
% of Total 
１ 
２ 
３ 
４ 
５ 
６ 
７ 
ＵＳ 
Ｊａｐａｎ 
Germany 
UK 
France 
China 
Italy 
117,343 
46,712 
27,547 
21,330 
20,463 
19,317 
16,801 
26.70 
        10.60 
         6.30 
         4.90 
         4.70 
         4.40 
         3.80 
【Ｓｏｕｒｃｅ：２１Ｃｅｎｔｕｒｙ  Cｈｕｕｇｏｋｕｓｏｕｋｅｎ，Ｋｅｙ Ｎｕｍｂｅｒ （Ｊａｐａｎｅｓｅ）Ｖｏｌ．２２，１ Ｊａｎ．２００６】   
  In addition, at the end of the 1990s, China began giving economic aid to its 
neighbors and countries in Africa, and as of 2005, has concluded 350 aid agreements 
with 112 countries that cover some 446 projects.５ １  After looking at the relations 
China has built with its fellow Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO: Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyz, 
Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan), Pakistan and Mongolia, there is 
only one way to respond: China has transformed itself into a developed world power, 
both politically and economically. 
2. The Post-Cold War Era and the Problems It Poses 
【Crisis in Taiwan Strait】 The end of the Cold War and new developments on 
Taiwan have forced the structure of Sino-Japanese relations to change. 
For example, during March and April of 1996, China began military missile 
maneuvers on the coast of the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to threaten the re-election 
bid of President Li Denghui. 
It was Li who in 1986 abolished any new restrictions on either political parties or 
the activities of the press, and the following year gave birth to the Democratic 
Progressive Party that swept him into the presidency in 1988. 
Then in June 1995, he rubbed the Mainland the wrong way with a journey, albeit 
in a private capacity, to the United States, drawing pages of invective from the 
People’s Daily. 
ThePeople’s Liberation Army’s missile maneuvers of March 1996 drew two 
aircraft carriers from the US 7th Fleet, which sailed into the Strait to see what was 
going on and cranked the tension up on US-China relations higher than since before 
diplomatic normalization. 
                                                             
５１  Kyoudo Press,China Watch, 5 Feb. 2006 
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Meanwhile, in Japan, while Prime Minister Hashimoto told everyone how 
“distraught” he was over this turn of events, the Diet House of Councilors 
Sub-Committee on Asian-Pacific Foreign Affairs passed a proposed resolution for 
solving the China-Taiwan problem peacefully.The proposal is noteworthy for its 
praise of Taiwanese democracy and the general election of its president and its hopes 
for democracy and human rights in both Taiwan and the PRC,５ ２  a resolution that no 
doubt managed to stir up the latter even further. 
The Japanese image of China had now changed within the scenario of 
democratically held elections vs. military harassment.According to polls carried out 
by the Cabinet Office concerning foreign diplomacy, the feeling of friendship towards 
China among the Japanese public began to fall after Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and 
fell even deeper after the events of 1996 (see Figure 4, p.52). 
 
【 reaggangement of US-Japan Alliance】   America’s post-Cold War military 
strategy in Asia as consolidated in 1995, when then Secretary of State Christopher 
testified in February before Congress that policy emphasized a broader engagement 
concerning China in terms of both US economic and strategic interests. 
The fact that the same direction applied to East Asia as a whole was made clear at 
the end of that month by a report submitted by Assistant Defense Secretary Joseph 
Nye on America’s East Asian strategy, to the effect that the reduction in US military 
presence in the region would be halted to maintain a force of 100 thousand troops, 
while at the same time aiming at revisions in the US-Japan alliance in response to 
“Rising China.”  
In November, Japan also decided, for the first time in nineteen years, on a “new 
defense agenda” in the absence of a Soviet presence in the Asian-Pacific region. The 
March 1996 bicoastal crisis in the Taiwan Strait merely accelerated the “redefinition” 
process. During his visit to Japan in April, President Clinton took the opportunity to 
issue a joint US-Japan statement on the “reconfirmation” of security issues and how 
they would move in response to “situations arising on the surrounding region.” 
China expressed concern about an increase in Japan’s military burden, transition 
to an offensive posture, and remilitarization, criticizing the US-Japan buildup as 
“Cold War thinking,” demanding ad nausea assurances that “the surrounding areas” 
did not include Taiwan. 
As to what “affairs in the surrounding region “ did mean would give rise to heated 
debate both within Japan and in its discussions with China, until in August 1997, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku stated, “Situations on the surrounding 
region  geographically include the Strait of Taiwan,” to which the People’s Daily 
(Sept. 19) rebutted with an op-ed entitled something like “Loose Lips Sink Ships.” 
 
                                                             
５２  Ibid., Nitchukankei Kihon Shiryoushu.  
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【New Guideline of the US-Japan alliance】 It wasn’t soon after, on the 24th, 
that the new US-Japan security guidelines were officially announced, with Article V 
calling for cooperation in the case of serious influences exerted on Japan’s peace and 
security due to situations arising in the surrounding region; and while the concept of 
“situations arising on the surrounding region” was defined not geographically but 
rather qualitatively, there is no doubt that any threatening situation arising in the 
vicinity of the Strait of Taiwan would most certainly come under Article V. 
On the next day the guidelines were announced, a Chinese Foreign Office 
spokesman expressed his country’s strong reaction, stating, “Including the Strait of 
Taiwan within the province of the US-Japan security cooperation is an invasion of 
Chinese sovereignty, it is intervention, which neither the Chinese government nor its 
citizens can tolerate. ” The People’s Daily published another op-ed “What are affairs 
in the Surrounding region”, again criticizing US-Japanese outdated “Cold War 
thinking.” 
Therefore, the 1996 Crisis of Taiwan Strait greatly influenced later events in two 
ways: first, it caused a worsening of China’s image in Japan, and secondly, it gave rise 
to a serious dispute in Sino-Japanese relations over the Taiwan question and its 
relationship to the US-Japan military alliance. 
Under these new stimuli, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyudao) came 
into the public spotlight. In July 1996, China formally protested the presence of a 
privately constructed lighthouse in the Islands by a Japanese right wing group as “an 
invasion of Chinese sovereignty,” followed by a small scale anti-Japanese “Diaoyudao 
is Ours” protest in September at Beijing University etc. 
The Japanese government’s refusal to officially recognize the structure as a 
lighthouse calmed the situation, until a Hong Kong-based activist group entered 
Japanese territorial waters, forced a landing on the site and caused a drowning 
incident. Then in May 1997, diet member and office manager of the Diet Alliance for 
the Dissemination of Historical Correctness, Nishimura Shingo, landed on the island 
giving rise to protests from both the PRC and Taiwan. 
Since the PRC’s official position is to put aside territorial problems and develop 
the Islands jointly with Japan, all the trouble was caused by a couple of insignificant 
citizen-based nationalist political groups. In China an NGO by the name of the 
“Diaoyudao Protection Coalition,” chaired by Tong Zeng, a leader in the movement 
demanding war reparations from Japan on the civil level also played a central role in 
the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005. 
3. Is the Postwar Era Really Over? 
【Japanese Double Standard】    It was during this time that the clear 
differences between the Japanese and Chinese perceptions about the Sino-Japanese 
War surfaced. 
 33
Until the 1990s China had dealt the problem by delineating between a group of 
militarists and the rest of the Japanese people they had exploited, a double standard 
in the strict meaning of the term.  However, during the late 90s, this double standard 
became more and more difficult to uphold, given the process of freer speech 
guaranteed under open-up policies and, of course, the spread of the Internet. Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai’s “March 1955 directive” came to be mocked as 
“mumbo-jumbo,” raising doubts and denials among the Chinese public about the 
“double standard” to describe the two-sides to Japan, which had been imposed for 
some 40 years. For many Chinese, the “end of the War” seemed to have just begun. 
A double standard also exists on the Japanese side. To the outside world, 
Japanese leaders have “reflected upon” and “apologized” time and again for the 
invasion of China and the colonization of Korea, including statements made first by 
Prime Minister Murayama, then Koizumi, on the occasions commemorating the 50th 
and 60th anniversaries of the War’s end.  
But something altogether different lurks underneath all this pomp and 
circumstance. One thing is the place in the hearts of the Japanese people held by the 
Yasukuni Shrine throughout the postwar era.  This is a religious institution that was 
established in 1869 as a Shinto shrine worshipping those who fell in battle for the 
Emperor’s cause during the Boshin Civil War, then was upgraded to a government 
funded shrine for war dead in general under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of the 
Imperial Army and Navy. 
With the separation of Shintoism and politics after the War, Yasukuni shrine was 
reorganized in 1952 as an independent religious foundation, but a persistent lobbying 
movement sponsored by families of a select group of war dead and a group of 
conservative politicians to have the shrine state-funded continued until 1975, when 
they finally decided to give up on the legislative route. Then in October 1978, the 
shrine secretly interred the remains of 14 A-class war criminals and included them in 
its commemorative rituals. 
Many Prime Ministers have worshipped at Yasukuni in both private and public 
capacities, one being PM Nakasone who appeared on War Memorial Day in 1985 to 
formally attend the ceremonies and consequently drew strong protest from both the 
Chinese and Korean governments. Since that time, the “Yasukuni problem” has 
become one political symbol of the unresolved historical issues pending between the 
two countries. 
It is under by means of such a double standard---expressing regret and contrition 
while on the way to worship at a shrine that honors war criminals---that postwar 
Japan has come to terms with its past.５ ３  
Ironically, the more the Japanese public comes to feel that “the postwar era is 
now over” after 50 years, the more Japan’s overt identity converges with the part of 
                                                             
５３  Concerning Japan’s postwar double identity, see Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no Sensoukan(War Images 
of Japanese),Iwanami Shoten, 1995. 
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the War that has lain beneath the surface for that same period of time.  The repeated 
attendance at the Shrine by prime ministers despite opposition at home and abroad, 
the struggle among cabinet ministers to be next in line and such comments made by 
top level bureaucrats as “the Far East Military Tribunal was a one-sided legal trial 
staged by the Occupation Forces in the name of crimes against peace and 
humanity…[but] Those convicted have never been considered guilty of such crimes in 
the eyes of the Japanese people” (Morioka Masahiro、Ministry of Health and Labor 
administrative affairs bureau chief). 
 
【Premier Murayama Statement】  Probably the best example of the historical 
perception gap between two countries is the simple fact that most Japanese think the 
postwar era is over, while most Chinese don’t. On 9 June 1995, the year of the 50th 
anniversary of the War’s end, the Diet House of Representative passed a decision to 
reaffirm Japan’s commitment to peace through the lessons of history.  Since the 
interpretation of what was to be resolved differed from political party to political 
party, it ended up sounding like Japan had not been the only aggressor. For example, 
the expression “transcending differences in historical views of past wars” indicates a 
clear lack of consensus about the wars Japan had conducted and, overall, left a bad 
taste in one’s mouth.  
Then on August 15, coalition government Prime Minister Murayama said in his 
commemorative speech, “During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, 
following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare 
the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression, 
caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, 
particularly to those of Asian nations. ……In a spirit of humility, these irrefutable 
facts of history, and【I would like to 】express here once again my feelings of deep 
remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of 
profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.  
Despite the absence of any legal obligations, this, so-called “50th anniversary 
statement,” was supposed to the official expression of how Japan felt about its past. 
However, in parts of China, Murayama’s statement was not perceived as a public 
apology. Jin Xide commented, “Does this represent the official intent of the Japanese 
nation? And what binding effect does it have on Japanese society?...Japan has yet to 
determine the elements of its history of aggression in a legislative fashion.”５ ４  The 
reason for Jin making such a comment was probably due to such observable behavior 
as repeated affirmations of the War on the part of cabinet members and attendance at 
Yasukuni Shrine by prime ministers. 
 
【Changes of Japanese political structure】  During the latter half of the 
                                                             
５４  Ibid., Jin Xide,Rizhong Guanxi. 
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1990s, Japan experienced tremendous changes in its political system. 
1993 saw the birth of a coalition government that destroyed the “1955 system” 
pitting the Liberal Democrats against the Socialists Cold War-style. 
In his A Renovation Plan for Japan, Ozawa Ichiro called for a transformation 
from a “defeated nation” to an “normal country;” and neo-nationalism based on 
traditional values came into vogue calling for a “reexamination of history.”  
Even the Socialist Party got into the act during July of the following year by 
abandoning the party line it had stood by for fifty years and accepting the existence of 
the National Defense Force, the US-Japan Security Treaty, the raising of the 
Hi-no-Maru National Flag and the singing of Kimi-ga-Yo as the National Anthem.  
Public opinion concerning Article IX of the Constitution abandoning acts of 
military aggression also changed markedly. The solid 60% opposition to revising the 
Constitution (specifically Article IX) of past decades began to be challenged beginning 
in 1992; and from 1995 the figure dropped to a little over 30%, with support for 
revision rising to over 50% (see Figure 3). Here was statistical proof that the postwar 
era had ended in the minds of the Japanese people.  
 
 36 
Figure 3: Trends in National Consciousness Towards the Constitution 
(1950-2005) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to an “ideology survey” conducted among almost 500 Diet members at 
the end of 1988 by Kabashima Ikuo, a Japanese political scientist, the Minshu 
(Democratic) Party, in particular, was going through the throes of generational 
infighting, pitting its many under-39 year-old members against party veterans over 
the issues of constitutional revision and military escalation proposed by the LDP.５ ５  
It was also younger Diet members who carried the standard of neo-nationalist ideas 
and the “reexamination of history” movement. 
It seems that Eugene Matthews was not far off the mark when he commented in 
2003 that many Japanese feel that their country has sufficiently apologized for 
mistakes committed sixty years ago, and it is now time to put forth its own agenda. ５ ６。 
 
【Call for Reparation in China】     The Chinese are moving in the opposite 
direction, as people who had kept their mouths shut through to the 1980s have since 
the end of that decade begun calling for war reparations on a civil level.  In 1990, 
Tong Zeng (then a teacher of law at the  Management Institute for Cadres of the 
Ministry of Chemical Industry) published a letter to the National People’s Congress 
calling for immediate action concerning such reparations and sent a petition to the 
National People’s Congress insisting that the government recognize the Chinese 
people’s right to demand them. 
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He asserted that, based on postwar international custom and data concerning the 
payment of reparations to other countries, reparations owed to China by the Japanese 
invaders for damages rendered between 1931 and 1945 come to US$300 billion, 
consisting of 120 billion in war reparations per se and 180 billion in 
damages…[despite the fact of relinquishing claims to the former in 1972], the Chinese 
government has never relinquished claims to the latter.５ ７  
Although the National People’s Congress refused to hear any proposals 
concerning war reparations, one cannot say for certain that  its refusal was based on 
the view that all such claims had already been relinquished by the government. As 
Chairman Jiang Zemin stated in a press conference on 1 April 1992 before his visit to 
Japan, “Any remaining issues should be settled through negotiations.”５ ８  
Then in 2000, Tong’s civil reparations movement set up a web site 
commemorating the Manchurian Incident (18 Sep 1931) entitled “How Could We 
Forget the History” (http://www.china918.net/en/index_en.htm) and would 
play central roles in the “defense” of Diaoyudao and the April 2005 anti-Japanese 
demonstrations.  
Incidentally, the official Chinese estimates of damages rendered by Japan 
between 1931 and 1945 come to US$100 billion in direct damages to the economy, 500 
billion in indirect damages, with human losses (war dead and wounded) at 35  
million (Address by Jiang Zenmin at a gathering on 3 Sep 1995 commemorating the 
50th anniversary of China’s V-J Day). 
The Japanese government’s response came in the form of a commitment to 
following strict legal procedures concerning reparations, but unfortunately historical 
issues cannot all be resolved by litigation and the letter of the law. This is the reason 
why the 1990s marked the in earnest beginning of the “postwar era” for those Chinese 
whose calls now fell upon deaf Japanese ears.  The gap between the two countries 
was widening and had to be filled somehow. 
4. Chinese Ultra-Nationalism and “New thinking on Japan" 
【Ultra-Nationalism】   The late 1990s were characterized by a rise in 
nationalism in both countries.We can see nationalisms are resonant with each 
other.In China, it took the form of emotion expressed on a mass scale, in Japan more 
in the realm of politics, marked by a revival of “traditional" Japanese values. In Japan 
the phenomenon flared in a wave of neo-nationalism, while in China it took a number 
of forms, ranging from extremism to a relatively cool, calm and collected newthinking 
on Japan.  
China's “official ideology" concerning Japan offered a dichotomybetween 
militarists and the rest of the people they had trampled upon (“liangfen lun"), the 
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former to be dealt with severely, the latter with tolerance. However, during the late 
1990s, this “official version" began to be abandoned in two main directions, 
ultra-nationalism and revisionism. The former is represented by a book written by 
young  journalists entitled Chinese Who Can Say “No!"５ ９  The book, which sold over 
1.3 million copies, expressed disgust over the image of those Chinese who had been 
unable to say “no” to either the Americans or Japanese for the past 150 years since the 
Opium Wars. 
The heated debate that took place in China over nationalism during the late 
1990s and early 2000s took mainly a radical, jingoist-like direction, taking China’s 
calm, realistic foreign policy to task as “showing weakness” and “appeasement” in the 
words of Wang Xiaodong of the Chinese Youth Research Center. 
In his “Contemporary Chinese Nationalism,” Wang, who was born in 1965 and 
graduated from Beijing University, attacked the trend popular during the reform era 
to refute anything resembling traditional Chinese culture, and called it “ethnic 
nihilism” spread by “masochistic intellectuals.” 
Wang argued that what determines the state and nation in the contemporary 
world is viable space and the idea of a minority deciding the destiny of the majority. 
Without a resolution to these two problems, human rights, environmental protection, 
and world peace cannot be realized. 
In his opinion, the reason why China's viable space is so cramped and dirty 
should not be blamed on the population policies of Mao Zedong, but rather on 
constant defeat in the global struggle since the beginning of the modern era…There is 
no such thing as a lasting friendship in international relations, only perpetuated 
interest."６ ０  For Wang, the fundamental rule of international relations is to fight the 
struggle for viable space and face the world with a militaristic mentality. 
 
【Angering youth】    It is not difficult to identify in the background to Wang's 
nationalism the existence of a feeling of being cooped in by some international 
containment, a national narcissism that cannot be satisfied through self-denial, and a 
feeling of inequality in the midst of spreading globalism. One can observe a 
claustrophobic mentality that has gripped urban youth in China (even since before the 
past 20-year period of sustained prosperity), combined ironically with the appearance 
of a “consciousness" about China's sudden emergence as a force to be dealt with in the 
world. 
Various versions of nationalism have appeared since the end of the 1990s in 
China, and therefore are not limited to Wang’s style, however, it is his kind of 
ultra-nationalism that seems to have captured the rapidly expanding world of the 
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Internet. ６ １  In the background of the almost instant spread of the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations throughout large urban areas in the spring of 2005, lurked the
“angering youth" (fenqing) and their infuriating by ultra-nationalist ideas.６ ２  
Although the public debate over nationalism in China tends  to become 
intertwined with strains of Wang’s radicalism, Jin Guangtao’s “idealism” and the 
government’s latest version of “patriotism,” there should is no confusion about the 
fact that the “state” and the “nation” are entities being treated conceptually as 
self-evident, absolute entities. 
In the words of Sumayama, a Japanese historian, “one characteristic feature of 
the Chinese nationalist debate is not extremism vs. moderation, but rather its 
inability to view the subject matter in relative terms either from within or without," 
thus shutting out “the possibilities for a world-scale ‘sence of public,' regional ‘sense 
of common' or personal ‘sense of private'.６ ３  Similar terrain (potholes) of nationalism 
in China can also be observed in contemporary Japan and part of Korea. 
 
【New image of Japan】    In response, a new image of Japan is being 
explored, which attempts to transcend the existing party line ideology out of anxiety 
concerning such current ultra-nationalistic sentiment. 1It was in 1997 that He Fang 
posed the epoch-making question “Can we really get along with the Japanese?"  As 
the liberal former director of the Institute of Japanese Studies,Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, government-sponsored think-tank, He's ideas about Japan do not get 
bogged down in the history of the Sino-Japanese War. 
He is a great fan of the role played by Japan in China's modernization, “regarding 
economic cooperation there is no other country that could have taken Japan's 
place…the key to a peaceful international environment is Sino-Japanese relations, and 
friendship with China will lead to improvements in relations with the Unites 
States…[therefore,] friendship with Japan is in China's best national interest."  
Regarding the notion of Japan's remilitarization, he argues that first it must be 
determined what exactly constitutes militarism and military ascendancy, concluding 
“at the present time Japan's military power is about the same as that of England and 
France. Given the continued absence of such offensive weapons as nuclear arms, 
aircraft carriers and long-range missiles and bombers in its arsenal, Japan could not 
pose any direct military threat to the Asian-Pacific region for the next ten to fifteen 
years." 
According to this analysis, the objectives of Japan’s mainliners is “to lose the 
image of a defeated country, stand on an equal footing with the other world powers [in 
the UN Security Council, etc.] and play an important role in international politics.” 
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He is more or less correct about Japan’s present situation in the statement, “The 
majority of Japanese will agree that the Pacific War involved its Imperial Army 
invading and colonizing China, Korea and elsewhere, and having occasion to commit 
acts of violence in the process, but it does not recognize that the War was an act of 
aggression on the part of Japan.”  Most Japanese “want to put an end to the past and 
treat the War as a page in history after fifty years;” and with the generational change 
that has taken place, “Politicians, the media and the people alike have grown sick of 
historical issues and become touchy about criticism from other countries. This is true 
even among those who are friendly towards China.” Despite the fact that He for the 
most part has put his finger directly on the pulse of Japan, his ideas have been treated 
with shock and criticism by his colleagues in Chinese academia. ６ ４  
Another piece of writing that went beyond the established wisdom came out in 
2001 at the hand of Feng Zhaokui, another member of the Institute of Japanese 
Studies. Feng decried the thumping the government’s “friend-foe” 
dichotomy(“liangfen lun”) of 1955 was getting over the Internet and elsewhere as 
“mumbo-jumbo,” out of concern that such a vociferous reaction to government policy 
could become the mainstay of its dealings with Japan in the future. His conclusion 
was that the “’historical issues’ issue” should be left to the Japanese public to decide. 
Such a realistic analysis approached that of pro-Chinese groups in Japan who were of 
the opinion that “conciliation” between the two countries should be thought of not as 
an entry, but rather as an exit.６ ５。  
 
【New Appraisal of Japan】   Just how diversified Chinese ideas about their 
country's relations with Japan have become of late is exemplified by the so-called 
“new thinking on Japan" that had the media so excited from late 2002 through the 
following year. The Japan travelogue written Ma Licheng (editor, People's Daily)in 
December 2002 was something never before seen in the literature to date.  
While introducing his readers to a socially stable Japan, materialistically and 
otherwise, and refuting on no uncertain terms even the slightest possibility of a 
revival of militarism there, Ma dispelled the ultra-nationalist hype of Wang and 
others as chauvinisitic, isolationist and narrow-minded. As to the historical issues, he 
stated, “The issue of Japan's apology has already been resolved; it is not necessary to 
have it in writing." Instead, “what is more important is to look forward. China and 
Japan together, as the stalwarts of Asia, should reflect on [the dangers of] nationalism, 
tear down narrow ideas and proceed towards unity."６ ６。  
The “new appraisal” offered in February 2003 by Shi Yinhong, an international 
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political scientist and professor at the Chinese People’s University, was more strategic 
in tone.  Drawing Shi’s deepest concern was the mutual hatred and suspicion that 
seemed to be growing between the two nations and extreme anti-Chinese sentiment 
among a portion of Japan’s nationalists. At this pace, China would soon be 
considering Japan in the same boat as the United States, Taiwan and India. 
Therefore, “by starting from a holistic viewpoint and basic, strategically-oriented 
principles, it will be possible to improve relations with Japan on a tremendous scale, 
bring the two countries together and thus concentrate on lasting security; that is, 
responding to the actual and latent interference from the United States and 
preventing Taiwanese independence.” This Shi referred to as “rapprochement,” 
resembling what happened between the two countries during 1971-72.In concrete 
terms, he proposed that; 
1. China should remove the issue of “historical issues” from its diplomatic 
agenda unless Japan does recede on China policy  
2. Japan increase investment and exports to China on a large enough scale 
to draw gratitude from Chinese leaders concerning its economic 
cooperation 
3. China proceed with the modernization of its armed forces while avoiding 
any implication of worry over Japanese military escalation and playing 
down its differences with Taiwan, 
4. China welcome Japan with open arms as a force in determining the 
security, political cooperation and economic affairs of East Asia, and  
5. China actively support Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council.６７ 
As one might expect, Shi’s idea of “a low cost diplomatic revolution” and his 
argument that it was assistance from Japan that greatly contributed to China’s 
economic development drew a good deal of reaction at home and abroad.  
 
【New Appraisal stands alone】   China's mainstream experts on Japanese 
affairs were up in arms. Jin Xide and Lin Zhibo(editor, People's Daily) attacked Shi's 
ideas as unrealistic, stating, for example, that 
1. Shi was unaware that responsibility for poor relations between the 
countries also lies with China, 
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2. China had already switched to a policy favoring Japan, so unless Japan 
responds with a “new appraisal” of its own, “rapprochement” would be 
out of the question, 
3. Any thought of rapprochement with Japan aiming at keeping the US at 
bay was preposterous.６８ 
Immediately after the release of Shi’s article, a piece entitled “Doubts 
Concerning the ‘New Appraisal of Japan’” written by Lin Zhibo, editor at the People’s 
Daily, began circulating on the People’s Net６ ９   
Then Zhang Yingzhuang of Nankai University joined in with an essay entitled 
“Foolishness to Make the Earth Shake and the Heavens Weep.” 
Zhang began with asking what is so wrong about a people who suffered 35 million 
casualties reacting “emotionally” towards their perpetrator. China’s small demands 
towards Japan’s would be laughed at in comparison with the those made by the Jews. 
In addition, 
1. Position and power within international politics is a zero-sum game, 
especially so in the geo-political juxtaposition of China and Japan. 
2. Any concession given to Japan would result in the loss of China’s 
international esteem. 
3. The remaining four of Shi’s proposals are based on the preconception 
that all the historical issues have been solved, as soon as they are solved, 
then the deal can be negotiated.７０。 
It was in this way that beginning with He Fang’s article in 1997, the subject of 
Japan, which had been previously limited to official proclamations, was opened up to 
public debate, although the ideas introduced above remain minority opinions and are 
often very unpopular. 
For example, Feng Zhaokui has been called anything from a “traitor” to a 
“Japanese slut” by Internet bloggers, while Ma Licheng quit his job at the People’s 
Daily and fled to Hong Kong. 
Of the discussion that has been carried on to date, the comments of Yang Kuisong, 
a historian of the Cold War era, leave the strongest impression. 
While still on the faculty of Beijing University, Yang, after attending seminar on 
China and Japan in the Pacific War from the end of the 1990s on, concluded rather 
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dismally that the discussion at these gatherings had less to do with scholarly debate 
than attempts to publicize and politicize the subject matter, as well as call Japan 
nasty names like “ethnically inferior.” 
The atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army during the War were 
not the result of inferior Japanese national character, but rather the character of war 
itself, and those Chinese scholars who continue to harp on Japanese inferiority are 
merely fanning the flames of bigotry among the Chinese people as a whole and 
creating a brand new cause for strained relations between the two countries.７ １   
The science of history is not just recounting facts, but also  instilling a historical 
consciousness in the future generations to allow them to shape a new history for 
themselves.  Exploiting the terms “national debate” and “research” to vent emotional 
frustrations about Japan and pointing to the emergence of neo-nationalism there as 
the most significant recent diplomatic development spell difficult times ahead for 
Sino-Japanese relations. 
5. Japanese Neo-Nationalism 
【New Textbook on History】   From the mid-1990s on, a change occurred in 
the editorializing done by the media and politicians towards the idea of “ the end of 
the postwar era," a reexamination of the post-postwar era and the reexamination of 
such historical events as the Pacific War: for example, recognizing that Japan did take 
aggressive action towards China and the rest of Asia, while refusing to recognize that 
the Sino-Japanese and Pacific Conflicts were “wars of aggression" per se. This 
interpretation of Japanese military action has gained a consensus in Japan, especially 
among its political leaders. The double standard of apologizing to the world for the 
War but inwardly closing one's eyes to the responsibility that war entails began to 
crumble when neo-nationalism came out of the closet. 
It was in 1989 that Ishihara Shintaro’s Japanese Who Can Say ‘No!’: New 
Directions in US-Japan Relations was published and became a million seller. 
Japanese “autonomy,” which was the focus of the book discussed in a no holds barred 
fashion, meant for the author autonomy from “the constitution foisted upon Japan by 
the Occupation Forces.” 
The mid-1990s marked a turning point with the House of Representative’s 
“Proclamation on the 50th Anniversary of the End of the War,” for beginners, 
followed by the formation of a Diet alliance among conservative LDP members 
dedicated to historical correctness, thus getting the movement to “reexamine history” 
well underway by a new generation excited about the timeworn issues of the 
politicization of school textbooks, politicians worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine and 
pro-Taiwanese politics. 
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The new generation of conservative Diet members embraced the “the 
reexamination of history” with a passion.  In February 1997, immediately following 
the formation of the “Committee to Write a New History Textbook” in December 1996 
(Nishio Kanji, chairman), a group of LDP Diet members reelected five times or less 
formed the core of the Young Diet Members Committee to Discuss Japan’s Past and 
Future (Nakagawa Shoichi, chairman, Abe Shinzo, general secretary.) Ｔhis group 
wholeheartedly supported the “Textbook Committee” and blossomed into a larger, 
multi-partisan committee to discuss the subject, formed in June 2001. 
What is important for the discussion here is that these groups and their Diet 
members were also advocates of strengthening relations between Japan and 
Taiwan.The formation in February 1997 of the multi-partisan Diet Member Confab on 
Japan-Taiwan Relations is one example of a pro-Taiwan group linked to the history 
revision movement and marked a smooth generational transition in the pro-Taiwan 
faction. 
The Textbook Committee was formed during that time and the Diet Proclamation 
was accompanied by the formation of the Liberal Historical View Research Group 
(Fujioka Nobukatsu, chairman), which criticized existing textbooks “for writing 
modern and contemporary Japanese history in the masochistic style of Crime and 
Punishment” and pledged to “write and publish history textbooks filled with 
confidence for future generations,” “aiming at history education that instills pride in 
one’s country.” 
However, the resulting textbooks, which rely on the art of mythology to paint 
modern Japanese history, including its wars, in the light of “nationalism,” have 
apparently not yet caught on, being chosen by 0.039% of Japanese schools in 2001 
and 0.43% in 2005.７ ２  
 
【Neo Nationalism】   The roots of neo-conservatism in Japan can be traced to 
the Nakasone regime of the mid-1980s, when attempts were made to “ end the 
postwar era" with such slogans as “ settling accounts in postwar politics once and for 
all," “ Japan as a player in world politics" and the US-Japan alliance as an 
“unsinkable aircraft carrier." 
However, “ending the postwar era" would have to wait for Ozawa Ichiro's Plan for 
Reconstructing Japan in 1993 under the motto, “We're just an normal country." It was 
also the year marking the collapse of the LDP regime and an end to its one-on-one 
partisan fight with the socialists since 1955. 
The differences between the “neo-conservatism” of the 1980s and the 
neo-nationalism of today are, first, the question of rebuilding Japan’s national 
identity by “indigienous” values. Here is where “reexamining history” makes it 
entrance to strike down the masochistic view of modern Japan based on its record of 
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aggression in favor of the “good old days.” 
Secondly, there is the attempt to write off the “postwar era” with revised versions 
both Article IX of the Constitution and educational programs set up emphasizing 
democratic ideas. 
Now, what do these “revisionists” have to say about China? Ishihara Shintaro 
says that the prime minister’s worship at Yasukuni Shrine is nothing more than “a 
solemn expression of gratitude for the historical achievements of Japan’s modern 
nation-builders by one of their heirs.” 
Concerning China proper, “Our next door neighbor, China, not only poses a 
threat through unnecessary expansion in the light of its military might, but also poses 
an extreme danger to the peace and security of our everyday lives due to the enormous 
social distortions which plague that nation.”７ ３。  
Another protagonist of neo-nationalism is Nakagawa Shoichi, minister of 
Economy and Industry and Agriculture in the Koizumi Cabinet and textbook 
revisionist. For him、the prime minister’s attendance at Yasukuni is ”to commemorate 
those who have sacrificed their lives for our country and to pray for peace.” In 
response to requests from the business community to postpone Yasukuni over 
possible ramifications for Sino-Japanese relations, “First you put him in office then 
tell not to go to Yasukuni, make up your minds!” and “any one in the business 
community [who thinks that A-class war criminals should be interred separately] can 
go do business in some other country.”７ ４。  
The grip secured by neo-nationalism on the media and politicians was made 
possible by the end to the Cold War and the advent of globalism.  
In the case of the latter, the belief that the world should be one big marketplace, 
neo-nationalists enjoy its benefits while resisting it for the sake of some jingoist 
national identity, sugar-coated with terms like “Japanese ethnic culture” and 
“tradition.” 
Another important cause is the economic performances of Korea and China that 
now rival Japan’s superiority. In particular, China’s 10% per annum economic 
growth rates over the past 20 years and the military outlays that have accompanied 
that prosperity have no doubt surprised, pressured and threatened a lot of people in 
Japan．  Moreover, neo-nationalism is the Japanese response to the highly energetic 
nationalist movements in China and Korea.  
 
【Worship Yasukuni Shrine】    The decision by Prime Minister Koizumi to 
continue attending Shinto services at Yasukuni Shrine throughout his term of office 
annoyed a lot of people in Korea and China. This decision is probably the reason why 
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Chinese and Japanese heads of state have not visited with one another over the past 
four years.  After his fifth visit to Yasukuni in October 2005, Koizumi emphasized 
that it was a personal decision made from the heart of one Japanese citizen. 
Koizumi said,“I who happens to be prime minister of Japan went, but it was 
Koizumi the individual who attended. It is a question of conscience, the freedom of 
which is guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution."７ ５  
So what are we to make of this “Yasukuni dilemma?” 
Any analysis has to start with three questions；  
1. Does attendance at the Shrine by the prime minister violate the 
Constitution’s separation of politics and religion? 
2. Is worshipping A-class war criminals a beatification of Japan’s war 
record? 
3. Is it just a cultural and domestic problem of Japan? Is it a problem that 
concerns foreign countries? 
To begin with, Yasukuni is a religious foundation practicing the Shinto liturgy, 
and all those who enter its gates to “commemorate” are willfully attending Shinto 
rites. 
According to a decision made by the Fukuoka District Court on 4 April 2004, 
“  [The prime minister's attendance] was done with full knowledge of the 
constitutional questions involved. His actions defy Constitution‘s Article XX Section 3 
prohibiting him from engaging in religious activities."７ ６  
Secondly, “A-class war criminals” denotes 28 Japanese convicted at the Far East 
International Military Tribunal (Tokyo) of “crimes against peace;" that is, ordering 
and leading a war of aggression. Of them, seven were executed, including former 
prime minister Tojo Hideki, army general Itagaki Seishiro and prime minister Hirota 
Kouki. The Yasukuni Shrine has incorporated into its “litany" these seven and seven 
others, including foreign minister Matsuoka Yosuke. In addition, the Shrine's 
“pantheon" also contains about 1000 convicted B- and C-class war criminals. 
The problem here is whether or not such people should be commemorated as war 
dead and war victims by Japan’s top minister of state. 
This is also related to how one regards the findings of the Tokyo Tribunal, which, 
the Yasukuni Shrine believes, ignored international law in its decisions, to the 
applause of neo-nationalist commentators and politicians. 
However, in September 1951, Japan accepted the terms of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty and became once again an independent country; and in 1986, when then 
Prime Minister Nakasone decided not to attend Yasukuni, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
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Gotoda clearly stated, “According to Article XI of the San Francisco Treaty, in its 
relations with other countries, Japan abides by the findings of the Far East Tribunal." 
Finally, and most vexing, is whether this problem can be considered a domestic 
issue; i.e., a particular aspect of Japanese culture. Recently, Koizumi himself has 
chosen to plead “cultural relativism" stating, “It's an aspect of the Japanese psyche."  
So has his cabinet. 
In Japan, after you die, everybody’s the same, no matter what you did 
during your lifetime; but in China, evildoers in this life go on as evildoers in 
the next. We should learn to recognize and understand such differences in 
our respective views on life and death” (Foreign Minister Machimura 
Nobutaka, 3 October 2004). 
First of all, war is not a cultural activity, but rather a serious political act 
perpetrated by a sovereign state toward a foreign entity.  
Secondly, in the words of Takahashi Tetsuya, a Japanese philosopher,the deities 
worshipped at Yasukuni are not just “those who died in Japan's wars," but rather “a 
select group of war dead chosen by the state for political purposes."７ ７  
If so, Yasukuni is not merely an internal question of the heart or indigenous 
culture, but rather an issue to be discussed with another group of victims created by 
the same political intent. 
 
【Yazukuni――as a political symbol】   This all leaves one in a quandary 
about how the “culture" and “personal convictions" of a single prime minister can 
throw relations between Japan and China into such a tizzy. After all, there are so 
many other problems to be solved between the two countries. But Yasukuni has 
become a symbol. 
For Japan, it is not a problem of “culture" but rather the pique arising out of 
having some foreign country tell it to quit doing something. For China, Yasukuni 
houses that same group of A-class war criminals that symbolizes the militarists who 
exist apart from the rest of the Japanese people they victimized, making up the 
dichotomy within one the basic principles governing its postwar relations with Japan. 
Chinese leadership is afraid of letting Yasukuni slide would not only fan the flames of 
emotional nationalism among the Chinese masses, but even threaten the legitimacy of 
the PRC government. 
As Zhu Jianrong puts it, by displaying 14 convicted A-class war criminals as the 
militarists who inhabit Japan and have them take all the blame for the War, Yasukuni 
becomes the means by which the historical issues between the two countries will be 
solved. It is similar to having Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four" take all the 
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responsibility for the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution.７ ８。  
Could there be anything more moronic for a political leader do than to throw the 
people of a neighboring country into a nationalistic frenzy over a point of “culture?"  
At least remove the A-class war criminals from the others, and set up a national 
monument and facility independent of religious foundations and national 
organizations to commemorate all of Japan's war dead, so as not to further politicize 
the Yasukuni problem. Do this and normal Sino-Japanese relations will soon be 
reopened. 
As long as Japan does nothing to create even a minimum degree of consensus 
about the War and responsibility for it through serious public debate, “the postwar 
era” will not come to an end. 
 
Ⅳ  A New Era of Sino-Japanese Relations 
1. The 2005 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations 
【Anti-Japanese demonstrations】    The wave of protest against Japan that 
flared up on the weekends during April 2005 were mob-like actions calling for a 
boycott on Japanese goods (despite the growing economic interdependence between 
the two countries) reminiscent of before 80 years slogans but bringing up a new issue, 
Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  
It all started on March 1 in Korea, when in a speech commemorating the 74th 
anniversary of the first Korean declaration of independence President Roo 
Moo-hyuncriticized Japan about their territorial dispute over the Liancourt Rocks and 
the historical issues that exist between their two countries, in addition to expressing 
Korea's unconditional “no" to Japan's Security Council seat. 
    Then on March 20th, the content of the Japanese textbook proposed by the 
New History Textbook Committee was leaked, and its website carried a list of over 
300 supporters and their affiliations. The list was duplicated in the 28 March issue of 
the International Herald Leader (Beijing) and created the false impression that the 
affiliated organizations listed were also in favor of the textbook. Topping the list was 
the Asahi Brewery, which became the subject of a boycott on its beer being marketed 
in the northeast region. The idea caught on and spread to the brands of other 
producers on the list. 
Around the same time, groups of Chinese activists at home and abroad initiated 
an Internet-based petition opposing Japan’s UN Security Council seat, and signatures 
rapidly increased into the billions. 
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Then on April 2nd a mob attacked a Japanese supermarket franchise in Sichuan 
Province, while demonstrations spread even in Guangdong from Shenzhen. A week 
later in Shanghai, a 50 to 60 thousand member demonstration was organized via the 
Internet and cell phones. Mob violence resulted in window smashing at a 
Japanese-run restaurant and the local Japanese Consulate. 
 
【Divergences in the Chinese Leadership】   It was on the 17th that the 
government finally stepped to control the demonstrations. On the 19th Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing in a briefing to his cadres stated that relations with Japan were 
important and to act calmly, while law enforcement agencies cracked down heavily on 
the demonstrations and arrested some of their leaders. Then it was observed that CCP 
leadership was divided in their opinions about the protests. 
After its formation in March 2003 the Hu Jintao  leadership decided not to 
touch upon China’s historical issues with Japan. However, at that year’s the Central 
Working Conference on Japanese affairs chaired by Tang Jiaxuan (State Councillor), 
pressure was applied by a group affiliated with diplomatic hardliner and former party 
Chairman Jiang Zemin to get those issues back on the agenda.７ ９。  
Just prior to the demonstrations, in March 2005, two conferences were held 
concerning policy towards Japan and resulted in three decisions; 
1. Both “ideological and psychological preparations” should be made for 
what seems to be rough road ahead for Sino-Japanese relations. 
2. If Japan takes a hard line, China will resist it; if Japan shows flexibility, 
China will respond positively. 
3. Channels in the private sector should be broadened in place of 
government level relations.８０。 
There is no doubt that China’s leadership was at odds about how to deal with 
Japan. Given the reasons for Hu Yaobang’s dismissal as General Secretary in 1987, 
issues related to Japan were important enough to shake and rattle the central 
leadership. 
 
【 Internet-Nationalism】  At the time of the demonstrations, many Japanese 
commentators in the media were of the opinion that; 
1. The Chinese government was behind the disturbances, 
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2. A power struggle had broken out at the central level over Sino-Japanese 
relations, and 
3. The demonstrations were the result of the “educational curricula 
emphasizing patriotism” that had been initiated since the mid-1990s. 
It seems, however, that the situation was somewhat more deeply embedded than 
that. Of course, the “patriotic education” campaign waged from 1994 had something to 
do with it, but more fundamentally, the root causes lay in the diversification of 
Chinese society and the expansion of freedom within it since the implementation of 
reforms emphasizing openness. 
Particularly noteworthy here is the perpetuation of the previously mentioned 
brand of nationalism combining pride as a world power with chauvinistic tendencies. 
Such ideas were probably blown out of proportion through the new information media 
of the Internet and the cell phone.  
The views of radical nationalism is popular among younger people using the 
Internet, for as Wang Xiaodong states, the task of a nationalist is to agitate for China 
as a super power. “Since the enormous development of the Internet in China from the 
end of the 1990s on, nationalism has been freed from the interdiction and taboos 
imposed by the media up to that time and become able to disseminate its ideas among 
the people faster and on a broader scale that ever before.” ８ １  
Former military man and editor of the People’s Daily Lin Zhibo has a clear and 
challenging view about how to deal with Japan: Appeal to the spontaneous ethnic 
emotions of the Chinese people, screaming at them, “be firm, don’t buy the friendship 
diplomacy line.” Why? Because “China is emerging and Japan wants none of it, 
economic relations are shifting from mutually offsetting to competitive.” Regarding 
Japan’s seat on the UN Security Council, the “angry young men” and their isolationist 
heroes chime in unison, “China should use its veto…If we don’t use it now, we never 
will.”８ ２。  
    From the recent statistics regarding the Internet, of the over 100 million Chinese 
users, 65% have incomes under 500 yuan, 30% have less than a high school education 
and 17% are under 18 years of age, ８ ３  meaning that it does not seem to the highly 
educated elite browsing through China’s chat rooms these days. 
The same phenomenon can be observed in Japan. Make everything simple and 
clear-cut, appeal to the emotions rather than reason, fill the air with stories of China 
that threaten and destabilize on emotional levels, emotional issues spread easier and 
sway evenly. Here we have one more crisis to be faced by Sino-Japanese relations, a 
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lack of objectivity on the part of the media and opinion leaders. 
 
2. Worsening Mutual Images 
【Sino-Japanese mutual images】  What was novel about the 2005 
anti-Japanese demonstrations was the inability to control the flow of information, 
which spread on the worldwide web and cell phone networks.  
Sino-Japanese relations had shifted from the government to the private sector. 
Lying in the background are both worsening PR about Japan among the Chinese 
population and chauvinistic ultra-nationalism. A downturn in the image one country 
holds of the other can be observed on both sides. 
According to an Institute of Japanese Studies public opinion survey in Autumn 
2004 concerning how Chinese felt about Japan (3000 respondents), 53.6% replied 
negatively(Japanese Studies, 2004, No. 6)  Trends in Japan are shown in Figure 4, 
the results of a Cabinet Office survey taken among 3000 subjects during October of 
every year since 1978. The downturn that has taken place in Japan’s image of China 
since the Tiananmen Incident lies in stark contrast to the upsurge in Korea’s image 
since the joint sponsorship of the Soccer World Cup and the popularity being enjoyed 
by Korean music and film in this country. 
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Figure 4: Changes in Japan's Image of China and Korea:1988-2005(%)  
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The downward trend continued through the Strait of Taiwan missile crisis (1996) 
until reaching an all-time low of 32.4 (personal) and 19.7% (diplomacy) after the 2005 
demonstrations.  The gap between the two figures also widened, indicating that the 
problem lay more on the government level that on an everyday level. However, the two 
images also tend to effect one another overall, due to the fact that public opinion 
reacts more emotionally than reasonably. 
 
3. New Things to Fight Over 
【permanent seat on the UN Security Council】   Probably the most 
shocking effect of the 2005 demonstrations for Japan was the petition that circulated 
around the world opposing its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
Most Japanese considered themselves a shoe-in for a place at the table, given their 
no.2 place in the world economy, footing over 20% of the UN’s expenses and top or 
second position among providers of foreign aid. 
A strong reaction was issued from the government and elsewhere, claiming that 
the petition reflected the Chinese government’s dissatisfaction with any improvement 
in Japan’s international political status.  Since the petition was circulated through 
China’s three leading portal sites (SINA, SOHU, NETEASE), these suspicions seem 
founded, in an indirect sense. 
Now, what about this so-called “official” government position? It is my opinion 
that the April demonstrations themselves were spontaneous occurrences; however, 
regarding the UN Security Council issue, I think the government was actively 
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involved. 
Immediately following the petition movement, Ling Qing, former Chinese 
ambassador to the UN expressed in a magazine article his strong opposition for the 
following reasons. 
1. By his decision to attend services at Yasukuni Shrine to honor A-class 
war criminals, the Japanese prime minister is expressing no “heartfelt 
apology” for the past and in the eyes of neighboring Asian nations such 
an attitude deserves no seat on the Security Counci 
2. Making the Taiwan issue a US-Japan “joint strategic objective” is also 
not up to snuff.８４。 
 
It was during the following July that the Chinese government publicly announced 
its opposition to the “four-nation plan” opening the Security Council to Japan, India, 
Germany and Brazil. 
For China, with its serious Taiwan Achilles tendon problem, Japan sporting a 
brand new and better alliance with the United States was hardly a desirable candidate 
to sit alongside of as an equal partner in the UN. It was in this sense that the 2005 
demonstrations marked the beginning of a new struggle between the two countries 
involving political power in both the immediate region and global society. 
 
【Taiwan issue and US-Japan security arrangement】    Let us now turn in 
more detail to these two root causes of China’s opposition to Japan’s bid to become a 
top player in international politics. In December 2004, the Koizumi Cabinet’s “new 
defense plan” touched on for the first time the necessity “to pay heed to the 
modernization of the Chinese military and its expanded maritime activities.” In the 
background of such an intent lay the incident involving a Chinese submarine’s 
incursion into Japanese waters.  
In February 2005 the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), which 
was convened in Washington DC by both countries’ ministers of foreign affairs and 
defense (2+2), came to an agreement on common security objectives based on military 
cooperation and the reorganization of US forces in Japan. 
In Section X of the resulting joint statement, entitled “Common Strategic 
Objectives in the Region,” hope was expressed for a peaceful resolution in the Strait of 
Taiwan and more military transparency on the part of China. It was the first time a 
document of this type had ever mentioned China in such a clear manner. 
Bitter opposition was immediately expressed by a Chinese Foreign Office 
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spokesperson, who stated, “The US-Japan military alliance is a two-nation 
relationship created on the unique historical conditions known as the Cold War and 
should not venture beyond the affairs of those nations. China is strongly opposed to 
the recent [SCC] joint statement.” ８ ５  
As a matter of fact, China is even more sensitive to US-Japan security relations 
touching upon the Strait of Taiwan than any historical issue that may exist with Japan 
and is ample proof, beyond the UN Security Council issue, that a power struggle has 
begun between the two countries within East Asia. 
 
【 territorial disputes】  Since 2005 the two countries have also been 
embroiled in territorial disputes related on both land and sea. One involves the East 
China Sea Exclusive Economic Zone. In response to Japan’s demand that under 
international law, the median line for demarcating territorial waters should be drawn 
equidistant between the Chinese coastline and the Okinawa Islands, China cites legal 
definitions of continental shelf extension in insisting on a 200 nautical mile distance 
to the Okinawa Trough. 
Another problem is the development of the natural gas field on the sea bottom 
boundary line of the East China Sea EEZ. A few years back China put the area up for 
public bid and a development project, including two US companies, was begun in the 
area that Japan insists lies on the EEZ border. 
Japan says that since the area under development lies only a few kilometers from 
the borderline, China’s attempt to extract gas there raises the possibility of tapping 
into the gas resources on the Japanese side of the ocean floor.  In Spring 2005, the 
Japanese Ministry of Economy and Industry announced that it had granted rights to a 
number of private enterprise to begin excavation testing, and since then, several have 
begun conducting tests. 
As Deng Xhaoping stated in October 1978 while on tour in Japan, “Both 
governments believe it is wise not to take up this issue [of the Senkaku Islands] at this 
time, since there is no harm in shelving it for even ten years if necessary…We will 
come to some mutually agreeable solution further on down the road,” ８ ６ the official 
Chinese attitude has been to put aside the territorial issue of the Islands and 
development them jointly. 
Given the fact that China and Japan rank first and second, respectively, among 
the world’s importers of energy, this is an issue that requires a rational solution 
through negotiations based on reason without entwining with issues of history.  
 
4. A New Structure of Sino-Japanese Relations 
【 three actors】    A recent feature characterizing relations between the two  
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countries is the great amount of influence that the people and public opinion have 
come to wield in the process. Figure 5 shows the changes which have occurred in the 
relationships among the government, private business and public opinion sectors 
through a comparison between 1972 and 2005. In 1972, at the time of diplomatic 
normalization, only the Chinese government was involved in relations with Japan, and 
turned a deaf ear to what anyone else had to say about them.  By “government” we 
mean only a few of the top leaders, like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. 
On the Japan side, there stood the business community, which was chomping at 
the bit for normalization, and public opinion had also favored the government 
establishing relations with China. Both factors were important in Tanaka Kakuei’s 
decision to move forward.  
The contrast between the two countries in 1972 is like night and day.   2005 
presents a more complicated set of circumstances, however, especially in the strong 
pressure being applied by public opinion in one country on the government and public 
opinion in the other. Moreover, it has become easy for public opinion in China these 
days to determine the legitimacy of any regime, and the government is particularly 
sensitive (susceptible) to what the people think about its relations with Japan. 
 
Figure 5: The Stratification of Sino-Japanese Relations: 1972 & 2005 
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【Tri-level issues】    The complex stratification of the players is matched by 
that of the issues themselves, as indicated by the three levels shown in Figure 6. The 
first level is related to “values” (in pink). The historical issues being related to the 
evaluation of the direction each state and people are headed, they have become 
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located on this “no deal” value level. 
Level two (in blue) is related to power on the international scene. The Taiwan 
question is closely tied to the power struggle in Asia. The US-Japan alliance and 
Japan’s bid for the UN Security Council are problems existing also on this level.They 
are also tied up with the historical issues on level one. 
Level three (in orange) contains specific issues concerning national interest, like 
the resources at the bottom of the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. 
Economic relations bind the two countries together even tighter with more friction in 
the offing, as China’s level of industrialization increases to the point of economic 
parity. 
 
Figure 6: The Tri-Level Structure of Sino-Japanese Issues: Values, Power and 
Interest 
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Conclusion: Seven Point Summary 
 
Looking back on the over half century of relations between China and Japan 
since the formation of the People’s Republic, the following points may help to sum up 
the situation. 
To begin with, up until the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries in 1972, relations that did exist were determined by an international 
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environment characterized by the Cold War, US-Japan relations and the Taiwan 
question, especially as it affected domestic politics in Japan, like the inner workings 
of the Liberal Democratic Party. Normalization was realized in the wake of China’s 
rapprochement with the United States; however, without the preexisting private 
sector economic relations, action taken by business leaders, efforts on the part of 
pro-China politicians and a Japanese public demanding something be done, 
normalization would not have gone as quickly and smoothly as it actually did. 
Secondly, normalization resulted in Japan breaking off relations with Taiwan and 
China relinquishing claims to war reparations. Japan’s reflection on its aggressive 
past was a crucial condition underlying the deal, but the resulting “1972 system” is by 
no means a perpetual one. On the one hand, the system has turned out to be 
insufficient in itself; on the other, its first 30 years of existence saw all kinds of 
tremendous changes in its international milieu, power relations between the two 
countries and the nature of the Taiwan question.  
Thirdly, after entering a period of turbulence from the mid-1990s on, 
Sino-Japanese relations have been in existing in a kind of limbo. Japan has come to 
the conclusion that “the postwar era is over,” and wants to be a “normal” country like 
everybody else, aspiring to prominence in world politics. China, on the other hand, 
has emerged as a first class world economic power, but for many of its people, “the 
postwar era” is still not over. The gap that has arisen in the two countries’ perceptions 
of what happened to the “postwar era” has accompanied the creation of a rivalry 
between the “two Asian powerhouses.” In this sense the two countries find themselves 
in an “era of mounting contradictions,” to use the phrase coined by Wang Jisi, a 
Chinese scholar on International Politics.８ ７  
Then there is the question of  her own Japanese strategy and policy direction 
concerning China, or rather the lack thereof except in 1980s. Up until normalization, 
the United States was the determining factor in Japan’s China policy. That is to say, 
Sino-Japanese relations existed only in within the realm of US-Japan relations. Then 
came domestic politics and Taiwan question, as strong determinants. 
And let’s not forget China itself, which can’t get over its infatuation with the idea 
that Japan consists of two groups: militaristic boogey men and the peace-loving 
people they victimized (liangfen lun). It is this idea that has determined China’s 
Japan policy for over 55 years now. This is not to say that China’s Japan policy has not 
wavered to and fro with the vagaries of Chinese politics and the whims of it leaders. 
Moreover, with the liberation of Chinese public opinion from the 1980s on, China’s 
Japanese problems are now capable of shaking political regimes to their cores.  
Number five on the list is what can only be called the “frailty” of relations 
between the two countries. This weakness did not appear along the structural lines of 
governments, political parties or bureaucracies, but rather at points of individual 
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leadership, policy-making ability and their images. This tendency is particularly 
strong on the Chinese side of the equation. 
For example, the reason why Sino-Japanese relations were at their best during 
the early 80s was probably the result of high trust of Chinese leaders to the Prime 
Minister Ohira Masayoshi individual. 
Then there is the rise of nationalism on both side of the fence: among the masses 
in China, among politicians and the media in Japan, but both swaying to the music 
together and causing the Sino-Japanese boat to rock more violently than ever before. 
What has to be done under such conditions is to create risk management mechanisms 
until the two countries can learn to trust one another.  
 
【6 proposals to rebuild Sino-Japanese Relations】  The above situation 
definitely requires both countries to make attempts at rebuilding relations, possibly 
along the following lines. 
1. Resort to reason. It is time that political leaders, the media, and the 
intellectual communities in both countries come to the realization that frailty does 
exist in their relations, unlike in those of any other countries, and so take serious 
steps to handle such a delicate condition. 
2. Hold regularly scheduled summit meetings. 
Be they in the form of mutual visits or meetings on the occasion of multi-national 
gatherings, it goes without saying that such meetings can only take place after Japan 
solves its “Yasukuni woes,” and China makes a concerted effort to get out of its 
“historical issue doldrums.” 
3. Open channels for every problem area on every level. All problems of 
interest to both parties can be solved through negotiation, as long as “values," 
“historical issues" and the like do not get in the way. Channels of communication 
should be opened separately for economic friction, territorial disputes, building an 
“East Asian Community," etc. 
4. Get the facts straight about the history of bilateral relations and East Asia. A 
joint committee made up of members representing Japan, China (and Korea) should 
be set up to discuss historical issues, including what is being taught in their schools, 
from a long-range perspective. The group could be organized on a government or 
third-sector level. What is important is responsible consultation continue among the 
parties concerned. 
5. Promote government-sponsored joint international projects (including 
Korea, if necessary). This is probably the most important step that should be taken. 
How about an environmental protection project or a comprehensive plan to deal with 
disaster prevention, containment and assistance.  I myself, majoring in education, 
proposed the establishment of an East Asian graduate studies educational network 
aimed at training leaders committed to mutual cooperation and regional security. 
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6. Create an “East Asian Community" or some other multinational organization. 
Japanese successes in Asian diplomacy have been few and far between---only the 
“Fukuda Doctrine" of 1977 and the Ohira administration's “Asian-Pacific vision" come 
to mind. China is no exception, seeking only bilateral relations with its neighbors in 
the region and until recently, refusing to perceive Asia as a geo-political region. 
In sum, although forming the core upon which cooperation in East Asia will be 
realized, both countries avoid Asia like the plague. The most feasible scenario they 
can come up with to date willbe a power struggle with each other over regional 
hegemony, one that the rest of Asia will not want to see. Rather, it's about time they 
live up to their credentials as “countries of Asia" and concentrate on developing ideas 
and protocols for regional diplomacy, a task that may end up promoting mutual trust 
and opening a way to solving their “historical" hang-ups. 
In any case, there is no doubt that Japan and China have entered a brand new 
phase in their relations, if the issues discussed in this article have any validity. The 
task before them now is to realize that fact, come up with rules to guide them based on 
the agreement made in 1972, and articulate a new framework for regional cooperation. 
■  
